The Discredites of Learning from Divines

In the entrance to the former of these; to cleere the way, & as it were to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the dignitie of Learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacite objections; I thinke good to deliver it from the discredites and disgraces which it hath received; all from ignorance; but ignorance severally disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeale and jealousie of Divines; sometimes in the severitie and arrogancie of Politiques, and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.

I heare the former sort say, that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution, that th’ aspiring to overmuch knowledge, was the originall temptation and sinne, whereupon ensued the fal of Man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the Serpent, and therefore where it entreth into a man, it makes him swel. Scientia inflat. That Salomon gives a Censure, That there is no end of making Bookes, and that much reading is wearinesse of the flesh. And againe in another place, That in spatious knowledge, there is much contristation, and that he that encreaseth knowledge, encreaseth anxietie: that Saint Paul gives a Caveat, that we be not spoyled through vaine Philosophie: that experience demonstrates, how learned men, have beene Arch-heretiques, how learned times have been enclined to Atheisme, and how the contemplation of second Causes doth derogate from our dependance upon God, who is the first cause.

To discover then the ignorance & error of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appeare these men doe not observe or consider, that it was not the pure knowledg of nature and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was the proude knowledge of good and evill, with an intent in man to give law unto himselfe, and to depend no more upon Gods commaundements, which was the fourme of the temptation; neither is it any quantitie of knowledge how great soever that can make the minde of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much lesse extend the soule of man, but God, and the contemplation of God; and therfore Salomon speaking of the two principall sences of Inquisition, the Eye, and the Eare, affirmeth that the Eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the Eare with hearing; and if there be no fulnesse, then is the Continent greater, than the Content; so of knowledge it selfe, and the minde of man, whereto the sences are but Reporters, he defineth likewise in these wordes, placed after that Kalender or Ephemerides, which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes; and concludeth thus: God hath made all thinges beautifull or decent in the true returne of their seasons. Also hee hath placed the world in Mans heart, yet cannot Man finde out the worke which God worketh from the beginning to the end: Declaring not obscurely, that God hath framed the minde of man as a mirrour, or glasse, capable of the Image of the universall world, and joyfull to receive the impression thereof, as the Eye joyeth to receive light, and not onely delighted in beholding the varietie of thinges and vicissitude of times, but raysed also to finde out and discerne the ordinances and decrees which throughout all those Changes are infallibly observed. And although hee doth insinuate that the supreame or summarie law of Nature, which he calleth, The worke which God worketh from the beginning to the end, is not possible to be found out by Man; yet that doth not derogate from the capacitie of the minde; but may bee referred to the impediments as of shortnesse of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other Inconveniences, whereunto the condition of Man is subject. For that nothing parcell of the world, is denied to Mans enquirie and invention: hee doth in another place rule over; when hee sayth, The Spirite of Man is as the Lampe of God, wherewith hee searcheth the inwardnesse of all secrets. If then such be the capacitie and receit of the mind of Man, it is manifest, that there is no daunger at all in the proportion or quantitie of knowledge howe large soever; least it should make it swell or outcompasse it selfe; no, but it is meerely the qualitie of knowledge, which be it in quantitie more or lesse, if it bee taken without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some Nature of venome or malignitie, and some effects of that venome which is ventositie or swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so soveraigne, is Charitie, which the Apostle imediately addeth to the former clause, for so he sayth, Knowledge bloweth up, but Charitie buildeth up; not unlike unto that which hee delivereth in another place: If I spake (sayth hee) with the tongues of men and Angels, and had not Charitie, it were but as a tinckling Cymball; not but that it is an excellent thinge to speake with the tongues of Men and Angels, but because if it bee severed from Charitie, and not referred to the good of Men and Mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthie glorie, than a meriting and substantiall vertue. And as for that Censure of Salomon concerning the excesse of writing and reading Bookes, and the anxietie of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge, and that admonition of Saint Paule, That wee bee not seduced by vayne Philosophie; let those places bee rightly understoode, and they doe indeede excellently sette foorth the true bounds and limitations, whereby humane knowledge is confined and circumscribed: and yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universall nature of thinges: for these limitations are three: The first, That wee doe not so place our felicitie in knowledge, as wee forget our mortalitie. The second, that we make application of our knowledge to give our selves repose and contentment, and not distast or repining. The third: that we doe not presume by the contemplation of Nature, to attaine to the misteries of God; for as touching the first of these, Salomon doth excellently expound himselfe in another place of the same Booke, where hee sayth; I sawe well that knowledge recedeth as farre from ignorance, as light doth from darkenesse, and that the wise mans eyes keepe watch in his head whereas the foole roundeth about in darkenesse: But withall I learned that the same mortalitie involveth them both. And for the second, certaine it is, there is no vexation or anxietie of minde, which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than meerely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seede of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in it selfe; but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their particuler, and ministring to themselves thereby weake feares, or vast desires, there groweth that carefulnesse and trouble of minde, which is spoken of: for then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, whereof Heraclitus the profound sayd, Lumen siccum optima anima, but it becommeth Lumen madidum, or maceratum, being steeped and infused in the humors of the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall thinke by view and enquiry into these sensible and material things to attaine that light, whereby he may reveale unto himselfe the nature or will of God: then indeed is he spoyled by vaine Philosophie: for the contemplation of Gods Creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God, no perfect knowledg, but wonder, which is broken knowledge: And therefore it was most aptly sayd by one of Platoes Schoole, That the sence of man caryeth a resemblance with the Sunne, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestriall Globe; but then againe it obscureth and concealeth the stars & celestiall Globe: So doth the Sence discover naturall thinges, but it darkeneth and shutteth up Divine. And hence it is true that it hath proceeded that divers great learned men have beene hereticall, whilest they have sought to flye up to the secrets of the Deitie by the waxen winges of the Sences: And as for the conceite that too much knowledge should encline a man to Atheisme, and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more devoute dependance uppon God, which is the first cause; First, it is good to aske the question which Job asked of his friends; Will you lye for God, as one man will doe for another, to gratifie him? for certaine it is, that God worketh nothing in Nature, but by second causes, and if they would have it otherwise beleeved, it is meere imposture, as it were in favour towardes God; and nothing else, but to offer to the Author of truth, the uncleane sacrifice of a lye. But further, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficiall knowledge of Philosophie may encline the minde of Man to Atheisme, but a further proceeding therein doth bring the mind backe againe to Religion: for in the entrance of Philosophie, when the second Causes, which are next unto the sences, do offer themselves to the minde of Man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on further, and seeth the dependance of causes, and the workes of providence; then according to the allegorie of the Poets, he will easily beleeve that the highest Linke of Natures chaine must needes be tyed to the foote of Jupiters chaire. To conclude therefore, let no man uppon a weake conceite of sobrietie, or an ill applyed moderation thinke or maintaine, that a man can search too farre, or bee too well studied in the Booke of Gods word, or in the Booke of Gods workes; Divinitie or Philosophie; but rather let men endeavour an endlesse progresse or proficience in both: only let men beware that they apply both to Charitie, and not to swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; and againe, that they doe not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together.