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book i

Discredite from Learned Men themselves

Now therefore, we come to that third sort of discredite, or diminution of credite, that groweth unto learning from learned men themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest; It is either from their Fortune, or from their Manners, or from the nature of their Studies: for the first, it is not in their power; and the second is accidentall; the third only is proper to be handled. but because we are not in hand with true measure, but with popular estimation & conceit, it is not amisse to speak somwhat of the two former. The derogations therfore, which grow to learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in respect of scarsity of meanes, or in respect of privatenesse of life, and meanesse of employments.

Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men, usually to beginne with little, and not to growe rich so fast as other men, by reason they convert not their labors chiefely to luker, and encrease; It were good to leave the common place in commendation of povertie to some Frier to handle, to whom much was attributed by Macciavell in this point, when he sayd, That the Kingdome of the Cleargie had beene long before at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the povertie of Friers had not borne out the scandall of the superfluities and excesses of Bishops and Prelates. So a man might say, that the felicitie and delicacie of Princes and great Persons, had long since turned to Rudenes and Barbarisme, if the povertie of Learning had not kept up Civilitie and Honor of life; But without any such advantages, it is worthy the observation, what a reverent and honoured thing povertie of fortune was, for some ages in the Romane State, which neverthelesse was a State without paradoxes. For we see what Titus Livius sayth in his introduction. Cæterum aut me amor negotij suscepti fallit , aut nulla unquam respublica, nec major, nec sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nec in quam tam seræ avaritia luxuriáque immigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniæ honos fuerit. We see likewise after that the State of Rome was not it selfe, but did degenerate; how that person that tooke upon him to be Counsellor to Julius Cæsar, after his victorie, where to begin his restauration of the State, maketh it of all points the most summarie to take away the estimation of wealth. Verum hæc & omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniae desinent; Si neque Magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda venalia erunt. To conclude this point, as it was truely sayd, that Rubor est virtutis color, though sometime it come from vice: So it may be fitly sayd, that Paupertas est virtutis fortuna. Though sometimes it may proceede from misgovernement and accident. Surely Salomon hath pronounced it both in censure, Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons; and in precept: Buy the truth, and sell it not: and so of wisedome and knowledge; judging that meanes were to be spent upon learning, and not learning to be applyed to meanes: And as for the privatenesse or obscurenesse (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men; it is a Theame so common, to extoll a priuate life, not taxed with sensualitie and sloth in comparison, and to the disadvantage of a civile life, for safety, libertie, pleasure and dignitie, or at least freedome from indignitie, as no man handleth it, but handleth it well: such a consonancie it hath to mens conceits in the expressing, and to mens consents in the allowing: this onely I will adde; that learned men forgotten in States, and not living in the eyes of men, are like the Images of Cassius and Brutus in the funerall of Junia; of which not being represented, as many others were Tacitus sayth, Eo ipso prefulgebant, quod non visebantur.

And for meanesse of employment, that which is most traduced to contempt, is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them, which age, because it is the age of least authoritie, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those employments wherin youth is conversant, and which are conversant about youth. But how unjust this traducement is, (if you will reduce thinges from popularitie of opinion to measure of reason) may appeare in that we see men are more curious what they put into a new Vessell, than into a Vessell seasoned; and what mould they lay about a young plant, than about a Plant corroborate; so as the weakest Termes and Times of all things use to have the best applications and helpes. And will you hearken to the Hebrew Rabynes? Your young men shall see Visions, and your old men shal dreame dreames, say the youth is the worthier age, for that Visions are neerer apparitions of God, than dreames? And let it bee noted, that how soever the Conditions of life of Pedantes hath been scorned upon Theators, as the Ape of Tyrannie; and that the modern loosenes or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choise of Schoolemasters, & Tutors; yet the ancient wisdome of the best times did alwaies make a just complaint; that States were too busie with their Lawes, and too negligent in point of education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of late times, by the Colledges of the Jesuites: of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say, Quo meliores, eo deteriores, yet in regard of this, and some other points concerning humane learning, and Morall matters, I may say as Agesilaus sayd to his enemie Farnabasus, Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses. And thus much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned men.

As touching the Manners of learned men, it is a thing personall and individuall, and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions, of all temperatures; but yet so as it is not without truth, which is sayd, that Abeunt studia in mores, Studies have an influence and operation, upon the manners of those that are conversant in them.

But upon an attentive, and indifferent review; I for my part, cannot find any disgrace to learning, can proceed from the manners of learned men; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be a fault, (which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca, and many moe) that because the times they read of, are commonly better than the times they live in; and the duties taught, better than the duties practised: They contend somtimes too farre, to bring thinges to perfection; and to reduce the corruption of manners, to honestie of precepts, or examples of too great height; And yet hereof they have Caveats ynough in their owne walkes: For Solon, when he was asked whether he had given his Citizens the best laws, answered wisely, Y ea of such, as they would receive: and Plato finding that his owne heart, could not agree with the corrupt manners of his Country, refused to beare place or office, saying: That a mans Countrey was to be used as his Parents were, that is, with humble per swasions, and not with contestations. And Cæsars Counsellor put in the same Caveat, Non ad vetera instituta revocans quæ jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt; and Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato the second, when he writes to his friend Atticus; Cato optimè sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublicæ; loquitur enim tanquam in repub: Platonis, non tanquam in fæce Romuli; and the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the Philosophers for going too far, and being too exact in their prescripts, when he saith; Isti ipsi præceptores virtutis & Magistri, videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen, ubi oportet, consisteremus: and yet himself might have said: Monitis sum minor ipse meis, for it was his own fault, thogh not in so extream a degre.

Another fault likewise much of this kind, hath beene incident to learned men; which is that they have esteemed the preservation, good, and honor of their Countreys or Maisters before their owne fortunes or safeties. For so sayth Demosthenes unto the Athenians; If it please you to note it, my counsels unto you, are not such, whereby I should grow great amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians: But they be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give, but are alwaies good for you to follow. And so Seneca after he had consecrated that Quinquennium Neronis to the eternall glorie of learned Governors, held on his honest and loyall course of good and free Counsell, after his Maister grew extreamely corrupt in his government; neither can this point otherwise be: for learning endueth mens mindes with a true sence of the frailtie of their persons, the casualtie of their fortunes, and the dignitie of their soule and vocation; so that it is impossible for them to esteeme that any greatnesse of their owne fortune can bee, a true or worthy end of their being and ordainment; and therefore are desirous to give their account to God, and so likewise to their Maisters under God (as Kinges and the States that they serve) in these words; Ecce tibi lucrifeci, and not Ecce mihi lucrifeci: whereas the corrupter sort of meere Politiques, that have not their thoughts established by learning in the love and apprehension of dutie, nor never looke abroad into universalitie; doe referre all thinges to themselves, and thrust themselves into the Center of the world, as if all lynes should meet in them and their fortunes; never caring in all tempests what becoms of the shippe of Estates, so they may save themselves in the Cockeboat of their owne fortune, whereas men that seele the weight of dutie, and know the limits of selfelove, use to make good their places & duties, though with perill. And if they stand in seditious and violent alterations; it is rather the reverence which many times both adverse parts doe giue to honestie, than any versatile advantage of their owne carriage. But for this point of tender sence, and fast obligation of dutie, which learning doth endue the minde withall, howsoever fortune may taxe it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it yet it will receive an open allowance, and therefore needes the lesse disproofe or excusation.

Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more probably defended, than truely denyed, is; that they fayle sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact application ariseth from two causes: The one because the largenesse of their minde can hardly confine it selfe to dwell in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature and customes of one person: for it is a speech for a Lover, & not for a wise man: Satis magnum alter alteri Theatrum sumus: Neverthelesse I shall yeeld, that he that cannot contract the sight of his minde, aswell as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great facultie. But there is a second cause, which is no inabilitie, but a rejection upon choise and judgement. For the honest and just bounds of observation, by one person upon another, extend no further, but to understand him sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or wherby to be able to give him faithfull Counsel, or wherby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a mans selfe: But to be speculative into another man, to the end to know how to worke him, or winde him, or governe him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of integritie, so towards Princes or Superiors, is want of dutie. For the custome of the Levant, which is, that subjects doe forbeare to gaze or fixe their eyes upon Princes, is in the outward Ceremonie barbarous; but the morall is good: For men ought not by cunning and bent observations to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of Kings, which the scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.

There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) which is often noted in learned men, that they doe many times fayle to observe decencie, and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinarie points of action; so as the vulgar sort of Capacities, doe make a Judgement of them in greater matters, by that which they finde wanting in them, in smaller. But this consequence doth oft deceive men, for which, I doe referre them over to that which was sayd by Themistocles arrogantly, and uncivily, being applyed to himselfe out of his owne mouth, but being applyed to the generall state of this question pertinently and justly; when being invited to touch a Lute, he sayd: He could not fiddle, but he could make a small Towne, a great state. So no doubt, many may be well seene in the passages of governement and policie, which are to seeke in little, and punctuall occasions; I referre them also to that, which Plato sayd of his Maister Socrates, whom he compared to the Gallypots of Apothecaries, which on the out - side had Apes and Owles, and Antiques, but contained with in soveraigne and precious liquors, and confections; acknowledging that to an externall report, he was not without superficiall levities, and deformities; but was inwardly replenished with excellent vertues and powers. And so much touching the point of manners of learned men.

But in the meane time, I have no purpose to give allowance to some conditions and courses base, and unworthy, wherein divers Professors of learning, have wronged themselves, and gone too farre; such as were those Trencher Philosophers, which in the later age of the Romane State, were usually in the houses of great persons, being little better than solemne Parasites; of which kinde, Lucian maketh a merrie description of the Philosopher, that the great Ladie tooke to ride with her in her Coach, and would needs have him carie her little Dogge, which he doing officiously, and yet uncomely, the Page scoffed. and sayd: That he doubted, the Philosopher of a Stoike, would turne to be a Cynike. But above all the rest, the grosse and palpable flatterie, whereunto many (not unlearned) have abbased & abused their wits and pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith,) Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of Learning Neither is the morall dedications of Bookes and Writings, as to Patrons to bee commended: for that Bookes (such as are worthy the name of Bookes) ought to have no Patrons, but Truth and Reason: And the ancient custome was, to dedicate them only to private and equall friendes, or to intitle the Bookes with their Names, or if to Kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the Booke was fit and proper for; but these and the like Courses may deserve rather reprehension, than defence.

Not that I can taxe or condemne the morigeration or application of learned men to men in fortune. For the answere was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in mockerie, How it came to passe that Philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of Philosophers? He answered soberly, and yet sharpely; Because the one sort knew what they had need of, & the other did not; And of the like nature was the answere which Aristippus made, when having a petition to Dionisius, and no eare given to him, he fell downe at his feete, whereupon Dionisius stayed, and gave him the hearing, and graunted it, and afterward some person tender on the behalfe Philosophie, reprooved Aristippus, that he would offer the Profession of Philosophie such an indignitie, as for a privat Suit to fall at a Tyrants feet: But he answered; It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionisius, that had his eares in his feete. Neither was it accounted weakenesse, but discretion in him that would not dispute his best with Adrianus Cæsar; excusing himselfe, That it was reason to yeeld to him, that commaunded thirtie Legions. These and the like applications and stooping to points of necessitie and convenience cannot bee disallowed: for though they may have some outward basenesse; yet in a Judgement truely made, they are to bee accounted submissions to the occasion, and not to the person.