contents
book ii

Humane Philosophy, or the Knowledge of our Selves

We come therefore now to that knowledge, whereunto the ancient Oracle directeth us, which is, the knowledge of our selves: which deserveth the more accurate handling, by howe much it toucheth us more neerely. This knowledge as it is the end and Terme of Naturall Philosophy in the intention of Man: So notwithstanding it is but a portion of Naturall Philosophy in the continent of Nature: And generally let this be a Rule, that all partitions of knowledges, be accepted rather for lines & veines, then for sections and separations: and that the continuance and entirenes of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary here of hath made particular Sciences, to become barren, shallow, & erronious: while they have not bin Nourished and Maintained from the common fountaine: Sowe see Cicero the Orator complained of Socrates and his Schoole, that he was the first that separated Philosophy, and Rhetoricke, whereupon Rhetorick became an emptie & verball Art. So wee may see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation of the earth, which Astronomie it self cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the Phainomena, yet Naturall Philosophy may correct. So we see also that the Science of Medicine, if it be destituted & forsaken by Natural Philosophy, it is not much better then an Empeirical practize: with this reservation therefore we proceed to Humane Philosophy or Humanitie, which hath two parts: The one considereth Man segregate, or distributively: The other congregate or in societie. So as Humane Philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or conjugate and Civile; Humanitie Particular consisteth of the same parts, whereof Man consisteth, that is, of Knowledges Which Respect The Body, & of Knowledges That Respect The Mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I doe take the consideration in generall, and at large of Humane Nature to be fit to be emancipate, & made a knowledge by it self; Not so much in regard of those delightfull and elegant discourses, which have bin made of the dignitie of Man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like Adjuncts of his common and undevided Nature, but chiefely in regard of the knowledge concerning the Sympathies And Concordances Betweene The Mind And Body, which being mixed, cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.

This knowledge hath two branches; for as all leagues and Amities consist of mutuall Intelligence, and mutuall Offices So this league of mind and body, hath these two parts, How the one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other. Discoverie, & Impression. The former of these hath begotten two Arts, both of Prediction or Prenotion where of the one is honoured with the enquirie of Aristotle, & the other of Hippocrates. And although they have of later time beene used to be coupled with superstitious and fantasticall arts; yet being purged and restored to their true state; they have both of them a solide ground in nature, and a profitable use in life. The first is Physiognomie, which discovereth the disposition of the mind, by the Lyneaments of the bodie. The second is the Exposition Of Naturall Dreames, which discovereth the state of the bodie, by the imaginations of the minde. In the former of these, I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath verie ingeniously, and diligently handled the factures of the bodie, but not the gestures of the bodie; which are no lesse comprehensible by art, and of greater use, and advantage. For the Lyneaments of the bodie doe disclose the disposition and inclination of the minde in generall; but the Motions of the countenance and parts, doe not onely so, but doe further disclose the present humour and state of the mind & will. For as your Majestie sayth most aptly and elegantly; As the Tongue speaketh to the Eare, so the gesture speaketh to the Eye. And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes doe dwell upon the faces and fashions of men; doe well know the advantage of this observation; as being most part of their abilitie; neither can it bee denied, but that it is a great discoverie of dissimulations, and a great direction in Businesse.

The later Braunch, touching Impression hath not beene collected into Art; but hath beene handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation or Antistrophe, that the former hath. For the consideration is double, Either How, And How Farre The Humours And Affects Of The Bodie, Doe Alter Or Worke Upon The Mind; or againe, How And How Farre The Passions, Or Apprehensions Of The Minde, Doe Alter Or Worke Upon The Bodie. The former of these, hath beene enquired and considered, as a part, and appendix of Medicine, but much more as a part of Religion or superstition. For the Phisitian prescribeth Cures of the minde in Phrensies, and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibite Medicines to exhilarate the minde, to confirme the courage, to clarifie the wits, to corroborate the memorie, and the like; but the scruples and superstitions of Diet, and other Regiment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the Heresy of the Manicheas, and in the Lawe of Mahumet doe exceede; So likewise the ordinances in the Ceremoniall Lawe, interdicting the eating of the blood, and the fatte; distinguishing between beasts cleane and uncleane for meat; are many and strict. Nay, the faith it selfe, being cleere and serene from all cloudes of Ceremonie, yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and other Macerations and humiliations of the bodie, as things reall, & not figurative. The roote and life of all which prescripts, is (besides the Ceremonie,) the consideration of that dependancie, which the affections of the mind are submitted unto, upon the state and disposition of the bodie. And if any man of weake judgement doe conceive, that this suffering of the minde from the bodie, doth either question the Immortalitie, or derogate from the soveraigntie of the soule: hee may be taught in easie instances, that the Infant in the mothers wombe, is compatible with the mother, and yet separable: And the most absolute Monarch is sometimes ledde by his servants, and yet without subjection As for the reciprocall knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the minde uppon the bodie; We see all wise Phisitians in the prescriptions of their regiments to their Patients, doe ever consider Accidentia animi: as of great force to further or hinder remedies, or recoveries; and more specially it is an inquirie of great depth and worth, concerning Imagination, how, and howe farre it altereth the bodie proper of the Imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not, it hath the same degree of power to helpe. No more than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent Ayres, able sodainely to kill a man in health; therefore there should bee soveraigne ayres, able sodainly to cure a man in sicknesse. But the inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates sayd, A Delian diver, being difficult & profound. But unto all this knowledge De Communi Vinculo, of the Concordances betweene the Mind and the bodie: that part of Enquirie is most necessarie, which considereth of the Seates, and Domiciles which the severall faculties of the minde, doe take and occupate in the Organs of the bodie, which knowledge hath been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to bee much better inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the Understanding in the Braine; Animositie, (which hee did unfitly call Anger, having a greater mixture with Pride) in the Heart; and Concupiscence or Sensualitie in the Liver, deserveth not to bee despised, but much lesse to be allowed. So then we have constituted (as in our own wish and advise) the inquirie Touching Humane Nature Entyer; as a just portion of knowledge, to be handled apart.