Divinitie and Philosophie

The knowledge of Man is as the waters, some descending from above, and some springing from beneath, the one informed by the light of Nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of Nature consisteth, in the Notions of the minde, and the Reports of the Sences, for as for knowledge which Man receiveth by teaching, it is Cumulative, and not Originall, as in a water, that besides his own spring-heade is fedde with other Springs and Streames. So then according to these two differing Illuminations, or Originals, Knowledge is first of al devided into Divinitie, and Philosophie.

In Philosophy, the contemplations of Man doe either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to Nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himselfe. Out of which severall inquiries, there doe arise three knowledges, Divine Philosophy, Natural Philosophy, and Humane Philosophy, or Humanitie. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple Character of the power of God, the difference of Nature, and the use of Man. But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge, are not like severall lines, that meete in one Angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree, that meete in a stemme; which hath a dimension and quantitie of entyrenes and continuance, before it come to discontinue & break it self into Armes and boughes, therfore it is good, before wee enter into the former distribution, to erect & constitute one universal Science by the name of Philosophia Prima, Primitive or Summariephilosophie, as the Maine and common way, before we come where the waies part, and devide themselves, which Science whether I should report as deficient or noe, I stand doubtfull. For I finde a certaine Rapsodie of Naturall Theologie, and of divers parts of Logicke: And of that part of Naturall Philosophie, which concerneth the Principles, and of that other part of Naturall Philosophy, which concerneth the Soule or Spirit, all these strangely commixed and confused: but being examined it seemeth to mee rather a depredation of other Sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of tearmes, then any thing solide or substantive of it selfe. Neverthelesse I cannot bee ignorant of the distinction which is currant, that the same things are handled but in severall respects: as for example that Logicke considereth of many things as they are in Notion & this Philosophy, as they are in Nature: the one in, Apparance, the other in Existence: But I finde this difference better made then pursued; For if they had considered Quantitie, Similitude, Diversitie, and the rest of those Externe Characters of things, as Philosophers, and in Nature: their inquiries must of force have beene of a farre other kinde then they are. For doth anie of them in handeling Quantitie, speake of the force of union, how, and how farre it multiplieth vertue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in Nature are so common and in so great Masse, and others so rare, and in so small quantitie? Doth anie in handling Similitude and Diversitie, assigne the cause why Iron should not moove to Iron, which is more like, but moove to the Loadestone, which is lesse like? why in all Diversities of things there should bee certaine Participles in Nature, which are almost ambiguous, to which kinde they should bee referred? But there is a meere and deepe silence, touching the Nature and operation of those Common adjuncts of things, as in Nature; and onely a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them, in speeche or argument. Therefore because in a Wryting of this Nature, I avoyde all subtilitie: my meaning touching this Originall or universall Philosophie, is thus in a plaine and grosse description by Negative: That it bee a Receptacle for all such profitable observations and Axioms, as fall not within the compasse of any of the speciall parts of Philosophie, or Sciences; but are more common, and of a higher stage.

Now that there are manie of that kinde neede not bee doubted: for example; Is not the rule: Si inæqualibus æqualia addas; omnia erunt inæqualia. An Axiome aswell of Justice; as of the Mathematiques? And is there not a true coincidence betweene commutative and distributive Justice, and Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion? Is not that other rule, Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, & inter se conveniunt, a Rule taken from the Mathematiques, but so potent in Logicke as all Syllogismes are built uppon it? Is not the observation, Omnia mutantur, nil interit, a contemplation in Philosophie thus, that the Quantum of Nature is eternall, In Naturall Theologie thus, That it requireth the same Omnipotencie to make somewhat Nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, Didici quod omnia opera quæ fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum, non possumus eis quicquam addere, nec auferre. Is not the ground which Machiauill wisely and largely discourseth concerning Governments, That the way to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them ad Principia; a rule in Religion and Nature, aswell as in Civill administration? was not the Persian Magicke a reduction or correspondence of the Principles & Architectures of Nature, to the rules and policie of Governments? Is not the precept of a Musitian, to fall from a discord or harsh accord, upon a concord, or sweete accord, alike true in affection? Is not the Trope of Musicke, to avoyde or slyde from the close or Cadence, common with the Trope of Rhetoricke of deceyving expectation? Is not the delight of the Quauering uppon a stoppe in Musicke, the same with the playing of Light uppon the water?

Are not the Organs of the sences of one kinde with the Organs of Reflexion, the Eye with a glasse, the Eate with a Cave or Straight determined and bounded? Neither are these onely similitudes, as men of narrowe observation may conceyve them to bee; but the same footesteppes of Nature, treading or printing uppon severall subjects or Matters. This Science therefore (as I understand it ) I may11Philosophia prima, sive de Fontibus Scientiarum. justlie reporte as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wittes, in handeling some particuler argument, will nowe and then drawe a Bucket of Water out of this well, for their present use: But the springhead thereof seemeth to mee, not to have beene visited; beeing of so excellent use, both for the disclosing of Nature, and the abridgement of Art.