Peccant Humours

The first of these is the extreame affecting of two extreamities; The one Antiquity, The other Novelty; wherein it seemeth the children of time doe take after the nature and mallice of the father. For as he devowreth his children; so one of them seeketh to devoure and suppresse the other; while Antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and Novelty cannot be content to add, but it must deface; Surely the advise of the Prophet is the true direction in this matter, State super vias antiquas, & videte quaenam sit via recta & bona, & ambulate in ea. Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stand thereupon, and discover what is the best way, but when the discovery is well taken then to make progression. And to speake truly, Antiquita seculi Juventus Mundi. These times are the ancient times when the world is ancient, & not those which we count antient Ordine retrogrado, by a computacion backward from our selves.

Another Error induced by the former is a distrust that any thing should bee now to bee found out which the world should have missed and passed over so long time, as if the same objection were to be made to time, that Lucian maketh to Jupiter, and other the heathen Gods, of which he woondreth, that they begot so many Children in old time, and begot none in his time, and asketh whether they were become septuagenarie, or whether the lawe Pappia made against old mens mariages had restrayned them. So it seemeth men doubt, least time is become past children and generation; wherein contrary wise, we see commonly the levitie and unconstancie of mens judgements, which till a matter bee done, wonder that it can be done; and assoone as it is done, woonder againe that it was no sooner done, as we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible enterprize; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livye to make no more of it, than this, Nil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere. And the same happened to Columbus in the westerne Navigation. But in intellectuall matters, it is much more common; as may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclyde, which till they bee demonstrate, they seeme strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the Lawyers speak) as if we had knowne them before.

Another Errour that hath also some affinitie with the former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after varietie and examination, the best hath still prevailed; and suppressed the rest; So as if a man should beginne the labour of a newe search, hee were but like to light uppon somewhat formerly rejected; and by rejection, brought into oblivion; as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitudes sake, were not readie to give passage, rather to that which is popular and superficiall, than to that which is substantiall and profound; for the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a River, or streame, which carryeth downe to us that which is light and blowne up; and sinketh and drowneth that which is weightie and solide.

Another Errour of a diverse nature from all the former, is the over-early and peremptorie reduction of knowledge into Arts and Methodes: from which time, commonly Sciences receive small or no augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, doe seldome grow to a further stature: so knowledge, while it is in Aphorismes and observations, it is in groweth; but when it once is comprehended inexact Methodes; it may perchance be further pollished and illustrate, and accommodated for use and practise; but it encreaseth no more in bulke and substance.

Another Errour which doth succeed that which we last mentioned, is, that after the distribution of particular Arts and Sciences, men have abandoned universalitie, or Philosophia prima; which cannot but cease, and stoppe all progression. For no perfect discoverie can bee made uppon a flatte, or a levell. Neither is it possible to discover the more remote, and deeper parts of any Science, if you stand but upon the levell of the same Science, and ascend not to a higher Science.

Another Error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kinde of adoration of the minde and understanding of man : by meanes whereof, men have withdrawne themselves too much from the contemplation of Nature, and the observations of experience: and have tumbled up and downe in their owne reason and conceits: upon these Intellectuallists, which are notwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine Philosophers; Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying: Men sought truth in their owne little worlds, and not in the great and common world: for they disdaine to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of Gods works, and contrarywise by continuall meditation and agitation of wit, doe urge, and as it were invocate their owne spirits, to divine, and give Oracles unto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.

Another Error that hath some connexion with this later, is, that men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines with some conceits which they have most admired, or some Sciences which they have most applyed; and given all things else a tincture according to them, utterly untrue and unproper. So hath Plato intermingled his Philosophie with Theologie, and Aristotle with Logicke, and the second Schoole of Plato, Proclus, and the rest, with the Mathematiques. For these were the Arts which had a kinde of Primo geniture with them severally. So have the Alchymists made a Philosophie out of a few experiments of the Furnace; and Gilbertus our Countrey man hath made a Philosophie out of the observations of a Loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the severall opinions of the nature of the soule, he found a Musitian, that held the soule was but a harmonie, sayth pleasantly: Hic ab arte sua non recessit, &c. But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely, when he sayth: Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronuntiant.

Another Errour is an impatience of doubt, and hast to assertion without due and mature suspention of judgement. For the two wayes of contemplation are not unlike the two wayes of action, commonly spoken of by the Ancients. The one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable: the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while faire and even, so it is in cotemplation, if a man will begin with certainties, hee shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to beginne with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

Another Error is in the manner of the tradition and deliverie of knowledge, which is for the most part Magistrall and peremptorie; and not ingenuous and faithfull, in a sort, as may be soonest beleeved; and not easilest examined. It is true, that in compendious Treatises for practise, that fourme is not to bee disallowed. But in the true handling of knowledge, men ought not to fall either on the one side into the veyne of Velleius the Epicurean: Nil tam metuens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur; Nor on the other side into Socrates his irronicall doubting of all things, but to propound things sincerely, with more or lesse asseveration: as they stand in a mans owne judgement, prooved more or lesse.

Other Errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours: for whereas the more constant and devote kind of Professors of any science ought to propound to themselves, to make some additions to their Science; they convert their labours to aspire to certaine second Prizes; as to be a profound Interpreter or Commenter; to be a sharpe Champion or Defender; to be a methodicall Compounder or abridger; and so the Patrimonie of knowledge commeth to be sometimes improoved: but seldome augmented.

But the greatest Error of all the rest, is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge: for men have entred into a desire of Learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a naturall curiositie, and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertaine their mindes with varietie and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to inable them to victorie of wit and contradiction, and most times for lukar and profession, and seldome sincerely to give a true account of their guist of reason, to the benefite and use of men: As if there were sought in knowledge a Cowch, wherupon to rest a searching and restlesse spirite; or a tarrasse for a wandring and variable minde, to walke up and downe with a faire prospect; or a Tower of State for a proude minde to raise it selfe upon; or a Fort or commaunding ground for strife and contention, or a Shoppe for profite or sale; and not a rich Store-house for the glorie of the Creator, and the reliefe of Mans estate. But this is that, which will indeed dignifie and exalt knowledge; if contemplation and action may be more neerely and straightly conjoyned and united together, than they have beene; a Conjunction like unto that of the two highest Planets, Saturne the Planet of rest and contemplation; and Jupiter the Planet of civile societie and action. Howbeit, I doe not meane when I speake of use and action, that end before mentioned of the applying of knowledge to luker and profession; For I am not ignorant howe much that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advauncement of knowledge; like unto the goulden ball throwne before Atalanta, which while shee goeth aside, and stoopeth to take up, the race is hindred,

Neither is my meaning as was spoken of Socrates, to call Philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth, that is, to leave natural Philosophy aside, & to applye knowledge onely to manners, and policie. But as both heaven and earth doe conspire and contribute to the use and benefite of man: So the end ought to bee from both Philosophies, to separate and reject vaine speculations, and whatsoever is emptie and voide, and to preserve and augment whatsoever is solide and fruitfull: that knowledge may not bee as a Curtezan for pleasure, & vanitie only, or as a bond-woman to acquire and gaine to her Masters use, but as a Spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort.

Thus have I described and opened as by a kinde of dissection, those peccant humors (the principall of them) which hath not onely given impediment to the proficience of Learning, but have given also occasion, to the traducement thereof: wherein if I have beene too plaine, it must bee remembred; Fidelia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis. This I thinke I have gained, that I ought to bee the better beleeved, in that which I shall say pertayning to commendation: because I have proceeded so freely, in that which concerneth censure. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a laudative of Learning, or to make a Hymne to the Muses (though I am of opinion, that it is long since their Rites were duely celebrated) but my intent is without varnish or amplification, justly to weigh the dignitie of knowledge in the ballance with other things, and to take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments divine, and humane.