Naturall Philosophie

Leaving therefore Divine Philosophy, or Naturall Theologie, (not Divinitie, or Inspired Theol’OGIE, which wee reserve for the last of all, as the Haven and Sabbath of all Mans contemplations) wee will nowe proceede to Naturall Philosophie: If then it bee true that Democritus sayde, That the truthe of Nature lyeth hydde in certaine deepe Mynes and Caves; And if it bee true likewise, that the Alchymists doe so much inculcate, That Vulcan is a second Nature, and imitateth that dexterouslie and compendiouslie, which Nature worketh by ambages, & length of time, It were good to devide Naturall Phylosophie into the Myne and the Fornace, and to make two professions or occupations of Naturall Philosophers, some to bee Pionners, and some Smythes, some to digge, and some to refine, and Hammer: And surely I doe best allowe of a division of that kinde, though in more familiar and scholasticall tearmes: Namely that these bee the two parts of Naturall Philosophie, the Inquisition Of Causes, and the Production Of Effects: Speculative, and Operative, Naturall Science, and Naturall Prudence. For as in Civile matters there is a wisedome of discourse, and a wisedome of direction: So is it in Naturall: And heere I will make a request, that for the latter (or at least for a parte thereof) I may revive and reintegrate the misapplyed and abused Name of Naturall Magicke, which in the true sense, is but Naturall Wisedome, or Naturall Prudence: taken according to the ancient acception, purged from vanitie & superstition. Now although it bee true, and I know it well, that there is an entercourse betweene Causes and Effects, so as both these knowledges Speculative & Operative, have a great connexion betweene themselves: yet because all true and frutefull Naturall Philosophie, hath A double Scale or Ladder, Ascendent and Descendent, ascending from experiments to the Invention of causes; and descending from causes, to the Invention of newe experiments; Therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled.

Naturall science or Theory is devided into Phisicke and Metaphisicke, wherein I desire, it may bee conceived, that I use the word Metaphisicke in a differing sense, from that, that is receyved: And in like manner I doubt not, but it will easilie appeare to men of judgement, that in this and other particulers, wheresoever my Conception & Notion may differ from the Auncient, yet I am studious to keepe the Auncient Termes. For hoping well to deliver my selfe from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I doe propounde: I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from Antiquitie, either in tearms or opinions, as may stand with truth, & the proficience of knowledge: And herein I cannot a little marvaile at the Philosopher Aristotle: that did proceede in such a Spirit of difference & contradiction towards all Antiquitie, undertaking not only to frame new wordes of Science at pleasure: but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisedome; insomuch as hee never nameth or mentioneth an Ancient Author or opinion, but to confute and reprove: wherein for glorie, and drawing followers and disciples, he tooke the right course, For certainly there commeth to passe, & hath place in humane truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis Me, Si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis. But in this divine Aphorisme (considering, to whom it was applied, Namely to Antichrist, the highest deceiver,) wee may discerne well, that the comming in a Mans owne name, without regard of Antiquitie, or paternitie; is no good signe of truth; although it bee joyned with the fortune and successe of an Eum recipietis. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will thinke of him, that hee learned that humour of his Scholler; with whom, it seemeth, hee did emulate, the one to conquer all Opinions, as the other to conquer all Nations. Wherein neverthelesse it may bee, hee may at some mens hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his Scholler did.

But to me on the other side that do desire as much as lyeth in my Penne, to ground a sociable entercourse betweene Antiquitie and Proficience, it seemeth best, to keepe way with Antiquitie usque ad aras; And therefore to retaine the ancient tearmes, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the Moderate proceeding in Civill government; where although there bee some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula.

To returne therefore to the use and acception of the tearme METAPHISICKE, as I doe nowe understand the word; It appeareth by that which hath bene alreadie saide, that I intend, PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA: SUMMARIE PHILOSOPHIE and METAPHISICK, which heretofore have beene confounded as one, to bee two distinct things. For the one I have made as a Parent, or common Auncestor to all knowledge; And the other I have now brought in, as a Branch or descendent of NATURALL SCIENCE; It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to SUMMARIEPHILOSOPHIE the common principles and Axiomes which are promiscuous and indifferent to severall Sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the inquirie touching the operation of the Relative and adventive Characters of Essences, as Quantitie, Similitude, Diversitie, Possibilitie, and the rest: with this distinction, and provision: that they bee handled as they have efficacie in Nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise that NATURAL THEOLOGIE which hereto fore hath beene handled confusedly with METAPHISICKE, I have inclosed and bounded by it selfe. It is therefore now a question, what is left remaining for METAPHISICKE: wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of Antiquitie; that PHISICKE should contemplate that which is inherent in Matter, & therefore transitorie, and METAPHISICKE, that which is abstracted & fixed. And againe that PHISICKE shoulde handle that which supposeth in Nature onely a being and moving, and METAPHISICKE should handle that which supposeth furder in Nature, a reason, understanding, and platforme. But the difference perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as wee devided Naturall Philosophy in Generall into the Enquirie of Causes & Productions of Effects: So that part which concerneth the Enquirie of Causes, wee doe subdivide, according to the received and sound division of CAUSES; The one part which is PHISICKE enquireth and handleth the MATERIALL & EFFICIENT CAUSES, & the other which is METAPHISICKE handleth the FORMAL and FINAL CAUSES.

PHISICKE, (taking it according to the derivation, & not according to our Idiome, for MEDICINE) is scituate in a middle tearme or distance between NATURALL HISTORY & METAPHISICKE. For Natural History describeth the varietie of things: PHISICKE the Causes, but Variable or Respective Causes; and Metaphisicke the Fixed and Constant Causes.

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay: Fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to Waxe. But fire is noe constant cause either of induration or colliquation: So then the Phisicall causes are but the Efficient and the Matter. Phisicke hath three parts, whereof two respect Nature United or collected, the third contemplateth Nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one entyer Totall, or else into the same Principles or Seedes. So as the first doctrine is Touching the Contexture or Configuration of Things, as De Mundo, de universitate Rerum. The seconde is the Doctrine CONCERNING the PRINCIPLES or ORIGINALS of THINGS; The third is the doctrine CONCERNING all VARIETIE and PARTICULARITIE of THINGS; whether it be of the differing substances, or their differing qualities and Natures; whereof there needeth noe enumeration; this part being but as a GLOS or PARAPHRASE that attendeth upon the Text of NATURAL HISTORY. Of these three I cannot report any as deficient, In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any Judgement: But they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the Labour of Man.

For METAPHISICKE, we have assigned unto it the inquirie of FORMALL and FINALL CAUSES which assignation, as to the former of them may seeme to bee Nugatorie and voide, because of the received and inveterate Opinion, that the inquisition of Man, is not competent to finde out essentiall formes, or true differences; of which opinion we will take this hold: That the Invention of Formes is of al other Parts of Knowledge the worthiest to bee sought, if it bee Possible to bee Found. As for the possibilitie, they are ill discoverers; that thinke there is no land when they can see nothing but Sea. But it is manifest, that Plato in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation scituate as upon a Cliffe, did descry, that formes were the true object of knowledge; but lost the reall fruite of his opinion by considering of formes, as absolutely abstracted from Matter, & not confined and determined by Matter: and so turning his opinion upon Theologie, wherewithall his Naturall Philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keepe a continuall watchfull and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, hee may advise and take Notice, what are the formes, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the State of Man. For as to the formes of substances (Man onely except, of whom it is said, Formauit hominem de limo terræ, & spiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitæ, and not as of all other creatures, Producant aquæ, producat terra, the formes of Substances I say (as they are nowe by compounding and transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to bee enquired. Noe more then it were either possible or to purpose, to seeke in grosse the formes of those Soundes which make wordes, which by composition and transposition of Letters are infinite. But on the otherside, to enquire the forme of those Soundes or Voices which make simple Letters is easily comprehensible, and being knowen, induceth and manifesteth the formes of all words, which consist, & are compounded of them; in the same maner to enquire the forme of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold: Nay of Water, of Aire, is a vaine pursuite: But to enquire the formes of Sence, of voluntary Motion, of Vegetation, of Colours, of Gravitie and Levitie, of Densitie, of Tenuitie, of Heate, of Cold, & al other Natures and qualities, which like an Alphabet are not many, & of which the essences (upheld by Matter) of all creatures doe consist: To enquire I say the true formes of these, is that part of Metaphisicke, which we now define of. Not but that Phisicke doth make enquirie, and take consideration of the same Natures, but how? Onely, as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the formes. For example, if the cause of whitenesse in Snowe or froth be enquired, and it be rendred thus: That the subtile intermixture of Ayre and water is the cause, it is well rendred, but neverthelesse is this the forme of whitenesse? Noe but11Metaphisica sive De formis & Finibus Rerum. it is the efficient, which is ever but vehiculum formæ. This, part of METAPHISICKE: I doe not finde laboured and performed, whereat I marvaile not, Because I hold it not possible to bee invented by that course of invention which hath beene used, in regard that men (which is the Roote of all error) have made too untimely a departure, and to remote a recesse from particulars.

But the use of this part of Metaphisicke which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: The one because it is the dutie and vertue of all knowledge to abridge the infinitie of individuall experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedie the complaint of vita breuis, ars longa; which is performed by uniting the Notions and conceptions of Sciences: For knowledges are as Pyramides, whereof History is the Basis: So of Natural Philosophy the Basis is Natural History: The Stage next the Basis is Phisicke: The STAGE next the VERTICALPOINT is METAPHISICKE: As for the VERTICALLPOINT, Opus quod operatur deus a principio usque ad finem, the Summary law of Nature, wee knowe not whether Mans enquirie can attaine unto it. But these three be the true Stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better then the Gyants Hilles.

But to those which referre all thinges to the Glorie of GOD, they are as the three acclamations: Sancte, Sancte, Sancte: holy in the description or dilatation of his workes, holy in the connexion, or concatenation of them, and holy in the union of them in a perpetuall and uniforme lawe. And therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, That all things by scale did ascend to unitie. So then alwaies that knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicitie, which appeareth to be METAPHISICKE, as that which considereth the simple formes or differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and coordinations whereof, make all this varietie: The second respect which valueth and commendeth this part of METAPHISICKE is, that it doth enfranchise the power of Man unto the greatest libertie, and possibilitie of workes and effects. For Phisicke carrieth men in narrow and restrained waies, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinarie flexuous courses of Nature, But Latæ undique sunt sapientibus viæ: To sapience (which was anciently defined to be Rerum divinarum, & humanarum scientia) there is ever choise of Meanes. For Phisicall causes give light to newe invention in Simili materia; But whosoever knoweth any forme knoweth the utmost possibilitie of superinducing that Nature upon any varietie of Matter, and so is lesse restrained in operation, either to the Basis of the Matter, or the condition of the efficient: which kinde of knowledge Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sort elegantly describeth, Non arctabuntur gressus tui, & currens non habebis offendiculum. The waies of sapience are not much lyable, either to particularitie or chance:

The 2. part of Metaphisicke is the Enqiry of FINAL Causes, which I am moved to report, not as omitted, but as misplaced; And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speake of it. For order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of Sciences: But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the Sciences themselves. For the handling of finall causes mixed with the rest in Phisicall enquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent enquirie of all reall and phisicall causes, and given men the occasion, to stay upon these satisfactorie and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of furder discoverie. For this I finde done not onely by Plato, who ever ancreth uppon that shoare, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which doe usually likewise fall uppon these flatts of discoursing causes; For to say that the haires of the Eye-liddes are for a quic-sette and fence about the Sight: Or, That the firmenesse of the Skinnes and Hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heate or cold: Or, That the bones are for the columnes or beames, whereupon the Frame of the bodies of living creatures are built; Or, That the leaves of trees are for protecting of the Fruite; Or, That the cloudes are for watering of the Eearth; Or, That the solidnesse of the Earth is for the station and Mansion of living creatures: and the like, is well inquired & collected in METAPHISICKE, but in PHISICKE they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but Remoraes and hinderances to stay and slugge the Shippe from furder sayling, and have brought this to passe, that the search of the Phisicall Causes hath beene neglected, and passed in silence. And therefore the Natural Philosophie of Democritus, and some others who did not suppose a Minde or Reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintaine it self to infinite essaies or proofes of Nature, which they tearme fortune; seemeth to mee (as farre as I can judge by the recitall and fragments which remaine unto us) in particularities of Phisicall causes more reall and better enquired then that of Aristotle and Plato, whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of Thelogie, and the other as a part of Logicke, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons. Not because those finall causes are not true, and worthy to bee inquired, beeing kept within their owne province; but because their excursions into the limits of Phisicall causes, hath bred a vastnesse and solitude in that tract. For otherwise keeping their precincts and borders, men are extreamely deceived if they thinke there is an Enmitie or repugnancie at all betweene them: For the cause rendred that the haires about the Eye liddes are for the safegard of the sight, doth not impugne the cause rendred, that Pilositie is incident to Orifices of Moisture: Muscosi fontes &c. Nor the cause rendred that the firmenesse of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heate or cold: doth not impugne the cause rendred, that contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts; in regard of their adiacence to forreine or unlike bodies, and so of the rest; both causes beeing true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence onely. Neither doth this call in question or derogate from divine Providence, but highly confirme and exalt it. For as in civill actions he is the greater and deeper pollitique, that can make other men the Instruments of his will and endes, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose: So as they shall doe it, and yet not knowe what they doe, then hee that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth: So is the wisdome of God more admirable, when Nature intendeth one thing, and Providence draweth forth another; then if hee had communicated to particular Creatures and Motions the Characters and Impressions of his Providence; And thus much for Metaphisicke, the later part wherof, I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper place.