Morall and Private Vertue

To proceede now from imperiall and militarie vertue, to morall and private vertue; first, it is an assured truth, which is contained in the verses;

It taketh away the wildnesse and barbarisme and fiercenesse of mens minds: but indeed the accent had need be upon, fideliter. For a little superficiall learning doth rather worke a contrary effect. It taketh away all levitie, temeritie, and insolencie, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the minde to ballance reasons on both sides, and to turne backe the first offers and conceits of the minde, and to accept of nothing but examined and tryed. It taketh away vaine admiration of any thing, which is the roote of all weakenesse. For all things are admired, either because they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation throughly, but will find that printed in his heart, Nil novi super terram: Neither can any man marvaile at the play of Puppets, that goeth behinde the curtaine, and adviseth well of the Motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after that hee was used to great Armies, and the great Conquests of the spatious Provinces in Asia, when hee received Letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage, or a Fort, or some walled Towne at the most, he sayd; It seemed to him, that he was advertised of the battailes of the Frogs, and the Mise, that the ould tales went of. So cettainely, if a man meditate much uppon the universall frame of nature, the earth with men uppon it (the divinesse of soules except) will not seeme much other, than an Ant-hill, whereas some Ants carrie corne, and some carrie their young: and some goe emptie, and all too and fro, a little heape of dust. It taketh away, or mitigateth feare of death, or adverse fortune: which is one of the greatest impediments of vertue, and imperfections of manners. For if a mans minde, be deepely seasoned with the consideration of the mortalitie and corruptible nature of thinges, hee will easily concurre with Epictetus, who went foorth one day, and sawe a woman weeping for her Pitcher of earth, that was broken; and went foorth the next day, and sawe a woman weepinge for her Sonne that was deade, and thereuppon sayde: Heri, vidi fragilem frangi, hodiè vidi mortalem mori. And therefore Virgill did excellently, and profoundlye couple the knowledge of causes, and the Conquest of all feares, together, as Concomitantia.

It were too long to goe over the particular remedies, which learning doth minister, to all the diseases of the minde, sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes encreasing appetite, somtimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like; and therefore I will conclude with that which hath rationem totius; which is, that it disposeth the constitution of the minde, not to be fixed or setled in the defects thereof; but still to be capable, and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the unlearned man knowes not, what it is to descend into himselfe, or to cal himselfe to account, nor the pleasure of that Suavissima vita, indies sentire se fieri meliorem: The good parts hee hath, hee will learne to shew to the full, and use them dexterously, but not much to encrease them: The faults he hath, he will learne how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill Mower, that mowes on still, and never whets his Syth: whereas, with the learned man, it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his minde, with the use and employment thereof: Nay further in generall and in sum: certain it is, that Veritas, and Bonitas differ, but as the Seale and the Print: for Truth prints Goodnesse, and they be the cloudes of Error, which descend in the stormes of passions and perturbations.

From morall vertue, let us passe on to matter of power and commandement, and consider whether in right reason, there be any comparable with that, wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth mans nature. We see the dignitie of the commandement, is according to the dignitie of the commaunded: to have commaundement over beasts, as Heard-men have, is a thing contemptible: to have commandement over children, as Schoole-Masters have, is a matter of small honor: to have commandement over Gally-slaves, is a disparagement, rather than an honour. Neither is the commaundement of Tyrants, much better over people, which have put off the Generositie of their mindes: And therefore it was ever holden, that honors in free Monarchies and Common-wealths, had a sweetnesse more, than in Tyrannies, because the commandement extendeth more over the wils of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And therefore when Virgill putteth himselfe forth to attribute to Augustus Cæsar the best of humane honours, hee doth it in these wordes:

But yet the commandement of knowledge, is yet higher, than the commandement over the will: for it is a commaundement over the reason, beleefe, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the minde, and giveth law to the will it selfe. For there is no power on earth, which setteth up a throne or chaire of Estate in the spirits, and soules of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beleefes: but knowledge and learning. And therefore wee see the detestable and extreame pleasure, that Arch-heretiques, and false Prophets, and Impostors are transported with, when they once finde in themselves, that they have a superioritie in the faith and conscience of men; so great, as if they have once tasted of it, it is seldome seene, that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandone it. But as this is that which the Author of the Revelation, calleth the depth or profoundnesse of Sathan: so by argument of contraries, the just and lawfull soveraignetie over mens understanding, by face of truth rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth neerest to the similitude of the divine rule.

As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning, is not so confined to give fortune only to states and Common-wealthes: as it doth not likewise give fortune to particular persons. For it was well noted long agoe, that Homer hath given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or Cæsar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses, and donatives, and distributions of Lands to so many legions. And no doubt, it is hard to say, whether armes or learning have advanced greater numbers. And in case of soveraigntie, wee see, that if armes or descent have carried away the Kingdome: yet learning hath carryed the Priest-hood, which ever hath been in some competicion with Empire.

Againe, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it farre surpasseth all other in nature: for shall the pleasures of the affections so exceede the sences, as much as the obtayning of desire or victorie, exceedeth a song, or a dinner? and must not of consequence, the pleasures of the intellect or understanding exceede the pleasures of the affections? we see in all other pleasures, there is sacietie; and after they be used, their verdour departeth; which sheweth well, they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was the noveltie which pleased, and not the qualitie. And therfore we see, that voluptuous men turne Friers; and ambitious Princes turne melancholy. But of knowledge there is no sacietie, but satisfaction and appetite, are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth to be good in it selfe simply, without fallacie or accident. Neither is that pleasure of small efficacie, and contentment to the minde of man, which the Poet Lucretius describeth elegantly,

Suave marimagno, turbantibus æquora ventis: &c.

It is a view of delight (sayth he) to stand or walke uppon the shoare side, and to see a Shippe tossed with tempest upon the sea; or to bee in a fortified Tower, and to see two Battailes joyne uppon a plaine. But it is a pleasure incomparable for the minde of man to bee setled, landed, and fortified in the certaintie of truth; and from thence to descrie and behould the errours, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and downe of other men.

Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning, man excelleth man in that, wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions; where in bodie he cannot come; and the like; let us conclude with the dignitie, and excellency of knowledge and learning, in that whereunto mans nature doth most aspire; which is immortalitie or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raysing of houses and families; to this buildings, foundations, and monuments, to this tendeth the desire of memorie, fame, and celebration; and in effect, the strength of all other humane desires; wee see then howe farre the monuments of wit and learning, are more durable, than the monuments of power, or of the hands. For have not the verses of Homer continued 25. hundred yeares, or more, without the losse of a sillable, or letter: during which time, infinite Pallaces, Temples, Castles, Cities have been decayed, and demolished? It is not possible to have the true pictures or statuaes of Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, no nor of the Kings, or great personages of much later yeares; for the originals cannot last; and the copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the Images of mens wits and knowledges remaine in Bookes, exempted from the wrong of time, and capable of perpetuall renovation: Neither are they fitly to be called Images, because they generate still, and cast their seedes in the mindes of others, provoking and causing infinit actions and opinions, in succeeding ages. So that if the invention of the Shippe was thought so noble, which carryeth riches, and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits: how much more are letters to bee magnified, which as Shippes, passe through the vast Seas of time, and make ages so distant, to participate of the wisedome, illuminations, and inventions the one of the other? Nay further wee see, some of the Philosophers which were least divine, and most immersed in the sences, and denyed generally the immortality of the soule; yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirite of man could act, and perfourme without the Organs of the bodie, they thought might remaine after death; which were only those of the understanding, and not of the affection; so immortall and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seeme unto them to be. But we that know by divine revelation, that not onely the understanding, but the affections purified, not onely the spirite, but the bodie changed shall be advanced to immortalitie, doe disclaime in these rudiments of the sences. But it must be remembred, both in this last point, and so it may likewise be needfull in other places, that in probation of the dignitie of knowledge, or learning I did in the beginning separate divine testimonie, from humane; which methode, I have pursued, and so handled them both apart.

Neverthelesse, I doe not pretend, and I know it will be impossible for me by any Pleading of mine, to reverse the judgement, either of Æsops Cocke, that preferred the Barly-corne, before the Gemme; or of Mydas, that being chosen Judge, betweene Apollo President of the Muses, and Pan God of the Flockes, judged for Plentie: or of Paris, that judged for Beautie, and sove against Wisedome and Power: or of Agrippina, Occidat matrem, modo imperet: that preferred Empire with condition never so detestable; or of Ulysses, Qui vetulam prætulit immortalitati, being a figure of those which preferre Custome and Habite before all excellencie; or of a number of the like popular Judgements. For these thinges continue, as they have beene: but so will that also continue, whereupon learning hath ever relyed, and which fayleth not: Justificata est sapientia à filijs suis.