The Faculties of the Minde of Man

The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, is of two kinds: The one respecting his Understanding and Reason, and the other his Will, Appetite, & Affection, wherof the former produceth Position or Decree, the later Action or Execution. It is true that the Imagination is an Agent, or Nuntius in both Provinces, both the Judiciall, and the Ministeriall. For Sence sendeth over to Imagination, before Reason have judged: and Reason sendeth over to Imagination, before the Decree can be acted. For Imagination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving that this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces; for the face towards Reason, hath the print of Truth. But the face towards Action, hath the print of Good; which neverthelesse are faces,

Quales decet esse sororum. Neither is the Imagination simply and onely a Messenger; but is invested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authoritie in it selfe; besides the duty of the Message. For it was well sayd by Aristotle: That the minde hath over the Bodie that commaundement which the Lord hath over a Bond-man; But, that Reason hath over the Imagination that Commandement, which a Magistrate hath over a free Citizen; who may come also to rule in his turne. For we see, that in matters of Faith & Religion, we raise our Imagination above our Reason, which is the cause why Religion sought ever accesse to the Minde by Similitudes, Types, Parables, Visions, Dreames. And againe in all perswasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impression of like Nature, which doe paint and disguise the true appearance of thinges, the cheefe recommendation unto Reason, is from the Imagination. Neverthelesse, because I finde not any Science, that doth properly or fitly pertaine to the Imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for Poesie, it is rather a pleasure, or play of imagination, than a worke or dutie thereof. And if it be a worke; wee speake not nowe of such partes of learning, as the Imagination produceth, but of such Sciences, as handle and consider of the Imagination. No more than wee shall speake nowe of such Knowledges, as reason produceth, (for that extendeth to all Philosophy) but of such Knowledges, as doe handle and enquire of the facultie of Reason; So as Poesie had his true place. As for the power of the Imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, wee have mentioned it in the Doctrine De Anima, wherunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for Imaginative, or Insinuative Reason, which is the subject of Rhetoricke, wee thinke it best to referre it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content our selves with the former division, that Humane Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, hath two parts, Rationall and Morall.

The part of humane Philosophie, which is Rationall, is of all knowledges to the most wits, the least delightfull: and seemeth but a Net of subtilitie and spinositie. For as it was truely sayd, that Knowledge is Pabulum animi; So in the Nature of mens appetite to this foode, most men are of the tast and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would faine have returned Adollas carnium, and were wearie of Manna, which though it were celestiall, yet seemed lesse nutritive and comfortable. So generally men tast well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, Civile Historie, Moralitie, Policie, about the which mens affections, praises, fortunes doe turne and are conversant: But this same Lumen siccum, doth parch and offend most mens watry and soft natures. But to speake truly of thinges as they are in worth, Rationall Knowledges; are the keyes of all other Arts; For as Aristotle sayth aptly and elegantly, That the hand is the Instrument of Instruments; and the minde is the Fourme of Fourmes: So these be truely said to be the Art of Arts: Neither do they onely direct, but likewise confirme and strengthen: even as the habite of shooting, doth not onely inable to shoote a neerer shoote, but also to draw a stronger Bowe.

The Arts Intellectuall, are foure in number, divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for mans labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded: or to judge that which is invented: or to retaine that which is judged: or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the Arts must bee foure: Arte of Enquirie or Invention: Art of Examination or Judgement: Art of Custodie or Memorie: and Art of Elocution or Tradition.