Invention

Invention is of two kindes much differing; The one of Arts and Sciences, and the other of Speech and Arguments. The former of these, I doe report deficient: which seemeth to me to be such a deficience, as if in the making of an Inventorie, touching the State of a defunct, it should be set downe, That there is no readie money. For as money will fetch all other commodities; so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered, if the use of the Mariners Needle, had not been first discovered; though the one bee vast Regions, and the other a small Motion. So it cannot be found strange, if Sciences bee no further discovered, if the Art it selfe of Invention and Discoverie, hath been passed over.

That this part of Knowledge is wanting, to my Judgement, standeth plainely confessed: for first Logicke doth not pretend to invent Sciences, or the Axiomes of Sciences, but passeth it over with a Cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the Empirical and Dogmaticall Sects of Phisitians, That Medicines and Cures, were first found out, and then after the Reasons and causes were discoursed: and not the Causes first found out, and by light from them the Medicines and Cures discovered. And Plato in his Theætetus noteth well, That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction: and that the pythe of all Sciences, which maketh the Arts-man differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in everie particular knowledge are taken from Tradition & Experience. And therefore wee see, that they which discourse of the Inventions and Originals of thinges, referre them rather to Chaunce, than to Art, and rather to Beasts, Birds, Fishes, Serpents, than to Men.

So that it was no marvaile, (the manner of Antiquitie being to consecrate Inventors) that the Ægyptians had so few humane Idols in their Temples, but almost all Brute:

And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first Inventions to Men, yet you will rather beleeve that Prometheus first stroake the flints, and marvailed at the sparke, than that when he first stroke the flints, he xpected the sparke; and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus, had no intelligence with the Europæan, because of the rarenesse with them of flint, that gave the first occasion: so as it should seeme, that hetherto men are rather beholden to a wilde Goat for Surgerie, or to a Nightingale for Musique or to the Ibis for some part of Phisicke, or to the Pot-lidde, that flew open for Artillerie, or generally to Chaunce, or any thinge else, than to Logicke for the Invention of Arts and Sciences. Neither is the fourme of Invention, which Virgill describeth much other.

For if you observe the words well, it is no other methode, than that which brute Beasts are capable of, and doe put in ure; which is a perpetuall intending or practising some one thing urged and imposed, by an absolute necessitie of conservation of being; For so Cicero sayth verie truly; Usus uni rei deditus, & Naturam & Artem sape vincit: And therefore if it bee sayd of Men,

It is likewise sayd of beasts, Quis Psittaco docuit suum χαιρε ? who taught the Raven in a drowth to throw pibbles into an hollow tree, where she spyed water, that the water might rise, so as shee might come to it? who taught the Bee to sayle through such a vast Sea of ayre, and to finde the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her Hive? who taught the Ant to bite everie graine of Corne, that she burieth in her hill, least it should take roote and growe? Adde then the word Extundere, which importeth the extreame difficultie, and the word Paulatim, which importeth the extreame slownesse; and we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians Gods; there being little left to the facultie of Reason, and nothing to the dutie of Art for matter of Invention.

Secondly, the Induction which the Logitians speake of and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the Principles of Sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the Principles; their fourme of Induction, I say is utterly vitious and incompetent: wherein their errour is the fowler, because it is the duetie of Art to perfecte and exalt Nature: but they contrariewise have wronged, abused, and traduced Nature. For hee that shall attentively observe howe the minde doth gather this excellent dew of Knowledge, like unto that which the Poet speaketh of Aerei mellis cælestia dona, destilling and contryving it out of particulars naturall and artificiall, as the flowers of the field and Garden: shall finde that the mind of her selfe by Nature doth mannage, and Acte an Induction, much better than they describe it. For to conclude uppon an Enumeration of particulars without instance contradictorie: is no conclusion: but a conjecture; for who can assure (in many subjects) uppon those particulars, which appeare of a side, that there are not other on the contrarie side, which appeare not? As if Samuell should have rested uppon those Sonnes of Issay, which were brought before him, and fayled of David, which was in the field. And this fourme (to say truth) is so grosse: as it had not beene possible for wittes so subtile, as have mannaged these thinges, to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their Theories and Dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornefull toward particulars, which their manner was to use, but as Lictores and Viatores for Sargeants and Wifflers, Ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make roome for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service; certainely, it is a thing may touch a man with a religious woonder, to see how the foot steps of seducement, are the very same in Divine and Humane truth: for as in Divine truth, Man cannot endure to become as a Child; So in Humane, they reputed the attending the Inductions (whereof wee speake) as if it were a second Infancie or Child hood.

Thirdly, allowe some Principles or Axiomes were rightly induced; yet neverthelesse certaine it is, that Middle Propositions, cannot be diduced from them in Subject of Nature by Syllogisme, that is, by Touch and Reduction of them to Principles in a Middle Terme. It is true, that in Sciences popular, as Moralities, Lawes, and the like, yea, and Divinitie (because it pleaseth God to apply himselfe to the capacity of the simplest) that fourme may have use; and in Naturall Philosophie likewise, by way of argument or satisfactorie Reason, Quæ assensum parit, Operis Effœta est: But the subtiltie of Nature and Operations will not bee inchayned in those bonds: For Arguments consist of Propositions, and Propositions of Words, and Wordes are but the Current Tokens or Markes of popular Notions of thinges: which Notions if they bee grossely and variably collected out of Particulars; It is not the laborious examination either of Consequences of Arguments,, or of the truth of Propositions, that can ever correct that Errour; being (as the Phisitians speake) in the first digestion; And therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent Philosophers became Sceptiques and Academiques, and denyed any certaintie of Knowledge, or Comprehension, and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended onely to Appearances, and Probabilities. It is true, that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a fourme of Irony, Scientiam dissimulando simulavit: For hee used to disable his knowledge, to the end to inhanse his Knowledge, like the Humor of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would Raigne, but would not acknowledge so much; And in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced; this opinion also of Acatalepsia (I doubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which excelled in Copie of speech, seeme to have chosen that Sect, as that which was fittest to give glorie to their eloquence, and variable discourses: being rather like Progresses of pleasure, than Journeyes to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both Academyes, did hold it in subtiltie, and integritie. But heere was their cheefe Errour; They charged the deceite uppon the The Sences; which in my Judgement (notwithstanding all their Cavillations) are verie sufficient to certifie and report truth (though not alwayes immediately, yet by comparison; by helpe of instrument; and by producing, and urging such things, as are too subtile for the sence, to some effect comprehensible, by the sence, and other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weaknes of the intellectual powers, & upon the maner of collecting, & concluding upon the reports of the sences. This I speake not to disable the minde of man, but to stirre it up to seeke helpe: for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadinesse of hand, which may bee easily done by helpe of a Ruler or Compasse.

This part of Invention, concerning the Invention of Sciences, I purpose (if God give mee leave)11Experientia literata, & interpretatio Naturæ. hereafter to propound: having digested it into two partes: whereof the one I tearme Experientia literata, and the other Interpretatio Naturæ: The former, being but a degree and rudiment of the later. But I will not dwell too long, nor speake too great upon a promise.

The Invention of speech or argument is not properly an Invention: for to Invent is to discover that we know not, & not to recover or resummon that which wee alreadie knowe; and the use of this Invention, is no other; But out of the Knowledge, whereof our minde is alreadie possest, to drawe foorth, or call before us that which may bee pertinent to the purpose, which wee take into our consideration. So as to speake truely, it is no Invention; but a Remembrance or Suggestion, with a Application: Which is the cause why the Schooles doe place it after Judgement, as subsequent and not precedent. Neverthelesse, because wee doe account it a Chase, aswell of Deere in an inclosed Parke, as in a Forrest at large: and that it hath alreadie obtayned the the name: Let it bee called Invention; so as it be perceyved and discerned, that the Scope and end of this Invention, is readynesse and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this readie use of Knowledge, there are two Courses: Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these, seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge; consisting rather of Diligence, than of any artificiall erudition And heerein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully doth deride the Sophists, neere his time, saying. They did as if one that professed the Art of Shooe-making, should not teach howe to make up a Shooe, but onely exhibite in a readinesse a number of Shooes of all fashions and Sizes. But yet a man might reply, that if a Shooemaker should have no Shooes in his Shoppe, but onely worke, as hee is bespoken, hee should bee weakely customed. But our Saviour, speaking of Divine Knowledge, sayth: That the Kingdome of Heaven, is like a good Housholder, that bringeth foorth both newe and ould store: And wee see the ancient Writers of Rhetoricke doe give it in precept: That Pleaders should have the Places, whereof they have most continuall use, readie handled in all the varietie that may bee, as that, To speake for the literall Interpretation of the Lawe against Equitie, and Contrarie: and to speake for Presumptions and Inferences against Testimonie; and Contrarie: And Cicero himselfe, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainely; That whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speake of, (if hee will take the paines) he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled in these. So that when hee commeth to a particular, he shall have nothing to doe, but to put too Names, and times, and places; and such other Circumstances of Individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes, who in regard of the great force, that the entrance and accesse into causes hath to make a good impression; had readie framed a number of Prefaces for Orations and Speeches. All which Authorities and Presidents may over way Aristotles opinion, that would have us chaunge a rich Wardrobe, for a paire of Sheares.

But the Nature of the Collection of this Provision or Preparatorie store, though it be common, both to Logicke, and Rhetoricke; yet having made an entrye of it heere, where it came first to be spoken of; I thinke fitte to referre over the further handling of it to Rhetoricke.

The other part of Invention, which I terme Suggestion, doth assigne and direct us to certaine Markes or Places, which may excite our Minde to returne and produce such Knowledge, as it hath formerly collected: to the end wee may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truely taken) onely to furnish argument, to dispute probably with others; But likewise to Minister unto our Judgement to conclude aright within our selves. Neither may these places serve onely to apprompt our Invention; but also to direct our enquirie. For a facultie of wise interrogating is halfe a knowledge; For as Plato saith; Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for, in a generall Notion; Else how shall he know it, when he hath found it? And therfore the larger your Anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same Places which will help us what to produce, of that which we know alreadie; will also helpe us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to aske; or if we have Bookes and Authors, to instruct us what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report, that this part of Invention, which is that which the Schooles call Topiques, is deficient.

Nevertheles Topiques are of 2. sorts general & speciall. The generall we have spoken to; but the particular hath ben touched by some, but rejected generally, as inartificial & variable. But leaving the humor which hath raigned too much in the Schooles (which is to be vainly subtile in a few thinges, which are within their command, and to reject the rest) I doe receive particular Topiques, that is places or directions of Invention and Inquirie in every particular knowledg, as thinges of great use; being Mixtures of Logique with the Matter of Sciences: for in these it holdeth; Ars inveniendi adolescit cum Inventis: for as in going of a way, wee doe not onely gaine that part of the waye which is passed, but wee gaine the better sight of that part of the waye which remayneth: So everie degree of proceeding in a Science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if wee strengthen, by drawing it foorth into questions or places inquirie, wee doe greatly advance our poursuyte.