The Artes of Judgement

Nowe wee passe unto the Artes Of Judgement, which handle the Natures of Proofes and Demonstrations; which as to Induction hath a Coincidence with Invention: For all Inductions whether in good or vitious fourme, the same action of the Minde which Inventeth, Judgeth; all one as in the sence: But otherwise it is in proofe by Syllogisme: For the proofe beeing not immediate but by meane: the Invention of the Meane is one thinge: and the Judgement of the Consequence is another. The one Excyting onely: the other Examining: Therefore for the reall and exacte fourme of Judgement, wee referre our selves to that which wee have spoken of Interpretation of Nature.

For the other Judgement by Syllogisme, as it is a thinge most agreeable to the Minde of Man: So it hath beene vehementlye and excellently laboured. For the Nature of Man doth extreamelye covet, to have somewhat in his Understanding fixed and unmooveable, and as a Rest, and Support of the Mind. And therefore as Aristotle endevoureth to proove, that in all Motion, there is some pointe quiescent; and as hee elegantlye expoundeth the auncient Fable of Atlas, (that stood fixed, and bare up the Heaven from falling) to bee meant of the Poles or Axel tree of Heaven, whereuppon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredlye men have a desire, to have an Atlas or Axel tree within: to keepe them from fluctuation; which is like to a perpetuall perill of falling: Therefore men did hasten to sette downe some Principles, about which the varietie of their disputations might turne.

So then this Art of Judgement, is but the Reduction of Propositions, to Principles in a Middle Tearme. The Principles to bee agreed by all, and exempted from Argument; The Middle Tearme to bee elected at the libertie of everie Mans Invention: The Reduction to be of two kindes Direct, and Inverted; the one when the Proposition is reduced to the Principle, which they terme a Probation ostensive: the other when the contradictorie of the Proposition is reduced to the contradictorie of the Principles, which is, that which they call Per Incommodum, or pressing an absurditie: the Number of Middle Termes to be, as the Proposition standeth, Degrees more or lesse, remooved from the Principle.

But this Arte hath twoo severall Methodes of Doctrine: the one by way of Direction, the other by way of Caution: the former frameth and setteth downe a true Fourme of Consequence, by the variations and deflexions, from which Errours and Inconsequences may bee exactly judged. Toward the Composition and structure of which fourme, it is incident to handle the partes thereof, which are Propositions, and the partes of Propositions, which are simple wordes. And this is that part of Logicke, which is comprehended in the Analytiques.

The second Methode of Doctrine, was introduced for expedite use, and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile fourmes of Sophismes, and Illaqueations, with their redargutions, which is that which is tearmed Elenches. For although in the more grosse sortes of Fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in jugling feates, which though wee knowe not howe they are done; yet wee knowe well it is not, as it seemeth to bee: yet the more subtile sort of them doth not onely put a man besides his answere, but doth many times abuse his Judgment.

This part concerning Elenches, is excellently handled by Aristotle in Precept, but more excellently by Plato in Example: not onely in the persons of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himselfe, who professing to affirme nothing, but to infirme that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the fourmes of objection, fallace and redargution. And although wee have sayd that the use of this Doctrine is for Redargution: yet it is manifest, the degenerate and corrupt is use for Caption and Contradiction, which passeth for a great facultie, and no doubt, is of verie great advauntage; though the difference bee good which was made betweene Orators and Sophisters, that the one is as the Greyhound, which hath his advauntage in the race, and the other as the Hare, which hath her advantage in the turne, so as it is the advauntage of the weaker creature.

But yet further, this Doctrine of Elenches, hath a more ample latitude and extent, than is perceived: namely unto divers partes of Knowledge: whereof some are laboured, and other omitted. For first, I conceive (though it maye seeme at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to Logicke, sometimes to Metaphysicke, touching the Common adjuncts of Essences, is but an Elenche: for the great Sophisme of all Sophismes, beeing Æquivocation or Ambiguitie of Wordes and Phrase, specially of such wordes as are most generall and interveyne everie Enquirie: It seemeth to me that the true and fruitfull use, (leaving vaine subtilities and speculations) of the Enquirie Majoritie, Minoritie, Prioritie, Posterioritie, Identitie, Diversitie, Possibilitie, Acte, Totalitie, Partes, Existence, Privation, and the like, are but wise Cautions againste Ambiguityes of Speech. So againe, the distribution of thinges into certaine Tribes, which we call Categories or Predicaments, are but Cautions against the confusion of Definitions and Divisions.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the Impression, and not by the subtiltie of the Illaqueation, not so much perplexing the Reason, as over-ruling it by power of the Imagination. But this part I thinke more proper to handle, when I shall speake of Rhetoricke.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kinde of Fallacies in the Minde of Man, which I finde not observed or enquired at all, and thinke good to place heere, as that which of all others appertayneth most to rectifie Judgement. The force whereof is such, as it doth not dazle, or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally, and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of Man is farre from the Nature of a cleare and equall glasse, wherein the beames of things should reflect according to their true incidence; Nay, it is rather like an inchanted glasse, full of superstition and Imposture, if it bee not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, lette us consider the false appearances, that are imposed uppon us by the generall Nature of the minde, behoulding them in an example or twoo, as firste in that instance which is the roote of all superstition: Namely, That to the Nature of the Minde of all Men it is consonant for the Affirmatiue, or Active to affect, more than the negative or Privative. So that a fewe times hitting, or presence, countervayles oft times fayling, or absence, as was well answered by Diagoras, to him that shewed him in Neptunes Temple, the great number of pictures, of such as had scaped Shippe-wracke, and had paide their Vowes to Neptune, saying: Advise nowe, you that thinke it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest: Yea, but (sayth Diagoras) where are they painted that are drowned? Lette us behould it in another instance, namely, That the spirite of man, beeing of an equall and unifourme substance, doth usually suppose and faine in Nature a greater equalitie and uniformitie, than is in truth; Hence it commeth, that the Mathematitians cannot satisfie themselves, except they reduce the Motions of the Celestiall bodyes, to perfect Circles, rejecting spirall lynes, and laboring to be discharged of Eccentriques. Hence it commeth, that whereas there are many thinges in Nature, as it were Monodica sui Juris; Yet the cogitations of Man, doe fayne unto them Relatives, Parallelles, and Conjugates, whereas no such thinge is; as they have fayned an Element of Fire to keepe square with Earth, Water, and Ayre, and the like; Nay, it is not credible, till it bee opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies, the similitude of humane Actions, & Arts, together with the making of Man Communis Mensura, have brought into naturall Philosophie: not much better, than the Heresie of the Anthropomorphites bredde in the Celles of grosse and solitarie Monkes, and the opinion of Epicurus, answearable to the same in heathenisme, who supposed the Gods to bee of humane Shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurian needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the Heavens with Starres, as if he had beene an Aedilis: One that should have set foorth some magnificent shewes or playes? for if that great Worke master had beene of an Humane disposition, hee woulde have caste the starres into some pleasant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the frettes in the Roofes of Houses, whereas one can scarce finde a Posture in square, or triangle, or streight line amongest such an infinite number, so differing an Harmonie, there is betweene the spirite of Man, and the spirite of Nature.

Lette us consider againe, the false appearances imposed upon us by everie Mans owne individuall Nature and Custome in that fayned supposition, that Plato maketh of the Cave: for certainely, if a childe were continued in a Grotte or Cave; under the Earth, untill maturitie of age, and came suddainely abroade, hee would have strange and absurd Imaginations; So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of Heaven, yet our spirites are included in the Caves of our owne complexions and Customes: which minister unto us infinite Errours and vaine opinions, if they bee not recalled to examination. But heereof wee have given many examples in one of the Errors, or peccant humours, which wee ranne briefely over in our first Booke.

And lastly, lette us consider the false appearances, that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed, and applyed according to the conceit, and capacities of the Vulgar sorte: And although wee thinke we governe our wordes, and prescribe it well. Loquendum ut Vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes: Yet certaine it is, that wordes, as a Tartars Bowe, doe shoote backe uppon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle, and pervert the Judgement. So as it is almost necessarie in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisedome of the Mathematicians, in setting downe in the verie beginning, the definitions of our wordes and termes, that others may knowe howe wee accept and understand them, and whether they concurre with us or no. For it commeth to passe for want of this, that we are sure to end there where wee ought to have begun, which is in questions & differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed, that it is not possible to divorce our selves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our Nature and Condition of life; So yet neverthelesse11Elenchi magni, sive de Idolis animi humani, nativis & adventitijs. the Caution of them (for all Elenches as was saide, are but Cautions) doth extreamely importe the true conducte of Humane Judgement. The particular Elenches or Cautions against these three false appearances, I finde altogether deficient.

There remayneth one parte of Judgement of great excellencie, which to mine understanding is so sleightly touched, as I maye reporte that also deficient, which is the application of the differinge kindes of Proofes, to the differing kindes of Subjects: for there beeing but foure kindes of demonstrations, that is by the immediate consent of the Minde or Sence; by Induction; by Sophisme; and by Congruitie, which is that which Aristotle calleth Demonstration in Orbe, or Circle, and not a Notioribus, everie of these hath certaine Subjects in the Matter of Sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certaine other, from which respectively they ought to be excluded, and the rigour, and curiositie, in requiring the more severe Proofes in some thinges, and chiefely the facilitie in contenting our selves with the more remisse Proofes in others, hath beene amongest the greatest causes of detryment and hinderance to Knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the Analogie of Sciences, I note as deficient.22De Analogia Demonstrationum.