The Methode of Tradition

For the Methode Of Tradition, I see it hath mooved a Controversie in our time. But as in Civile businesse, if there bee a meeting and men fall at Wordes, there is commonly an end of the Matter for that time, and no proceeding at all: So in Learning, where there is much controversie, there is many times little Enquirie. For this part of knowledge of Methode seemeth to mee so weakely enquired, as I shall report it deficient.

Methode hath beene placed, and that not amisse in Logicke, as a part of Judgement; For as the Doctrine of Syllogismes comprehendeth the rules of Judgement uppon that which is invented; So the Doctrine of Methode contayneth the rules of Judgement uppon that which is to bee delivered, for Judgement precedeth Deliverie, as it followeth Inventions. Neither is the Methode, or the Nature Of The Tradition materiall onely to the Use of Knowledge, but likewise to the Progression of Knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man, cannot attaine to perfection of Knowledge; the Wisedome of the Tradition, is that which inspireth the felicitie of continuance, and proceding. And therefore the most reall diversitie of Methode, is of Methode Referred To Use, and Methode Referred To Progression, whereof the one may bee tearmed Magistrall, and the other of Probation.

The later whereof seemeth to be Via deserta & interclusa. For as Knowledges are now delivered, there is a kinde of Contract of Errour, betweene the Deliverer, and the Receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge; desireth to deliver it in such fourme, as may be best beleeved; and not as may best examined: and hee that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant Enquirie, & so rather not to doubt, than not to erre: glorie making the Author not to lay open his weaknesse, and sloth making the Disciple not to knowe his strength.

But knowledge, that is delivered as a threade to bee spunne on, ought to bee delivered and intimated, if it were possible, In the same Methode wherein it was invented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge; no man knoweth howe hee came to the knowledge which hee hath obtayned. But yet neverthelesse Secundum maius & minus, a man may revisite, and descend unto the foundations of his Knowledge and Consent: and so transplant it into another, as it grewe in his owne Minde. For it is in Knowledges, as it is in Plantes; if you meane to use the Plant, it is no matter for the Rootes: But if you meane to remoove it to growe, then it is more assured to rest uppon rootes, than Slippes: So the deliverie of Knowledges (as it is nowe used) is as of faire bodies of Trees without the Rootes: good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter: But if you will have Sciences growe; it is lesse matter for the shafte, or bodie of the Tree, so you looke well to the takinge up of the Rootes. Of which kinde of deliverie the Methode of the Mathematiques,11De Methodo syncera, sive ad filios Scientiarum. in that Subject, hath some shadowe; but generally I see it neither put in ure, nor put in Inquisition: and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diversitie of Methode there is, which hath some affinitie with the former, used in some cases, by the discretion of the Auncients; but disgraced since by the Impostures of many vaine persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeite Marchandizes; and that is Enigmaticall and Disclosed. The pretence whereof, is to remoove the vulgar Capacities from beeing admitted to the secretes of Knowledges, and to reserve them to selected Auditors: or wittes of such sharpenesse as can pearce the vayle.

Another diversitie of Methode, whereof the consequence is great, is the deliverie of knowledge in Aphorismes, or in Methodes; wherein wee may observe, that it hath beene too much taken into Custome, out of a fewe Axiomes or Observations, uppon any Subjecte, to make a solemne, and formall Art; filling it with some Discourses, and illustratinge it with Examples; and digesting it into a sensible Methode: But the writinge in Aphorismes, hath manye excellent vertues, whereto the writinge in Methode doth not approach.

For first, it tryeth the Writer, whether hee be superficiall or solide: For Aphorismes, except they should bee ridiculous, cannot bee made but of the pyth and heart of Sciences: for discourse of illustration is cut off, Recitalles of Examples are cut off: Discourse of Connexion, and order is cut off; Descriptions of Practize, are cutte off; So there remayneth nothinge to fill the Aphorismes, but some good quantitie of Observation: And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write Aphorismes, but hee that is sound and grounded. But in Methodes,

As a Man shall make a great shew of an Art, which if it were disioynted, would come to little. Secondly, Methodes are more fit to winne Consent; or beleefe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carrie a kinde of Demonstration in Orbe or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore satisfie. But particulars beeing dispersed, doe best agree with dispersed directions. And lastlye Aphorismes, representing a knowledge broken, doe invite men to enquire further; whereas Methodes carrying the shewe of a Totall, doe secure men; as if they were at furthest.

Another Diversitie of Methode, which is likewise of great weight, is, The handling of knowledge by Assertions, and their Proofes; or by Questions, and their Determinations: The latter kinde whereof, if it bee immoderately followed, is as prejudiciall to the proceeding of Learning, as it is to the proceedinge of an Armie, to goe about to besiege everie little Forte, or Holde. For if the Field bee kept, and the summe of the Enterprize pursued, those smaller thinges will come in of themselves; Indeede a Man would not leave some important peece Enemie at his backe. In like manner, the use of confutation in the deliverie of Sciences ought to be verie sparing; and to serve to remoove stronge Preoccupations and Prejudgements, and not to minister and excite Disputations and doubts.

Another Diversitie of Methodes, is, According to the Subject or Matter, which is handled. For there is a great difference in Deliverie of the Mathematiques, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and Policie, which is the most immersed; And howsoever contention hath been mooved, touching an uniformitie of Methode in Multiformitie of Matter: Yet wee see howe that opinion, besides the weakenesse of it, hath beene of ill desert, towardes Learning, as that which taketh the way, to reduce Learning to certaine emptie and barren Generalities; beeing but the verie Huskes, and Shales of Sciences, all the kernell beeing forced out, and expulsed, with the torture and presse of the Methode: And therefore as I did allow well of particular topiques for Invention: so I doe allow likewise of particular Methodes of Tradition.

Another Diversitie of Judgement in the deliverie and teaching of knowledge, is, According unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered: For that knowledge, which is newe and forreine from opinions received, is to bee delivered in another fourme, than that that is agreeable and familiar; And therefore Aristotle, when he thinkes to taxe Democritus, doth in truth, commend him; where hee sayth: If wee shall indeede dispute, and not followe after Similitudes, &c. For those, whose conceites are seated in popular opinions, neede onely but to proove or dispute: but those, whose Conceits are beyonde popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to proove and demonstrate. So that it is of necessitie with them to have recourse to similitudes, and translations, to expresse themselves. And therefore in the Infancie of Learning, and in rude times, when those Conceits, which are now triviall, were then newe; the World was full of Parables and Similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without Marke, or else rejected for Paradoxes, that which was offered; before they had understoode or judged. So; in Divine Learning, wee see howe frequent Parables and Tropes are; For it is a Rule, That whatsoever Science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in ayde of Similitudes.

There be also other Diversities of Methodes vulgar and received: as that of Resolution, or Analysis, of Constitution, or Systasis, of Concealement, or Cryptique, &c. which I doe allowe well of; though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembred to this purpose, because I would erecte and constitute22De prudentia Traditionis. one generall Enquirie (which seemes to mee deficient) touching the Wisedome of Tradition.

But unto this part of Knowledge, concerning Methode, doth further belong, not onely the Architecture of the whole frame of a Worke, but also the severall beames and Columnes thereof; not as to their stuffe, but as to their quantitie, and figure: And therefore, Methode considereth, not onely the disposition of the Argument or Subject, but likewise the Propositions: not as to their Truth or Matter, but as to their Limitation and Manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deale, in reviving the good Rules of Propositions, Καθόλου πρωτον Κατα παντος . &c. than he did in introducing the Canker of Epitomes: And yet, (as it is the Condition of Humane thinges, that according to the ancient Fables, The most pretious thinges have the most pernitious Keepers) It was so, that the attempt of the one, made him fall upon the other. For hee had neede be well conducted, that should designe to make Axiomes Convertible: If he make them not withall Circular, and Non promovent, or Incurring into themselves: but yet the Intention was excellent.

The other Considerations of Methode, concerning Propositions, are chiefely touching the utmost Propositions, which limit the Dimensions of Sciences: for everie Knowledge may bee fitly sayd, besides the Profunditie (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solide) to have a Longitude, and a Latitude: accounting the latitude towardes other Sciences: and the Longitude towards Action: that is, from the greatest Generalitie, to the most particular Precept: The one giveth Rule howe farre one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the Province of another, which is the Rule they call Καθαυτο . The other giveth Rule, unto what degree of particularitie, a knowledge should descend: which latter I finde passed over in silence; being in my Judgement, the more materiall. For certainely, there must bee somewhat left to practise; but howe much is worthy the Enquirie: wee see remote and superficiall Generalities, doe but offer Knowledge, to scorne of practicall men: and are no more ayding to practise, than an Ortelius universall Mappe, is to direct the way betweene London and Yorke. The better sort of Rules, have beene not unfitly compared to glasses of steele unpullished; where you may see the Images of thinges, but first they must bee filed: So the Rules will helpe, if they bee laboured and pullished by practise. But howe Christallyne they33De Productione Axiomatum. may bee made at the first, and howe farre forth they may be pullished afore-hand, is the question; the Enquirie whereof, seeemeth to me deficient.

There hath beene also laboured, and put in practise a Methode, which is not a lawfull Methode, but a Methode of Imposture; which is to deliver knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a shewe of Learning, who have it not; such was the travaile of Raymundus Lullius, in making that Art, which beares his name; not unlike to some Bookes of Typocosmy, which have beene made since; beeing nothing but a Masse of words of all Arts; to give men countenance, that those which use the tearmes; might bee thought to understand the Art; which Collections are much like a Frippers or Brokers shoppe; that hath ends of everie thing, but nothing of worth.