Rhetoricke, or Art of Eloquence

Nowe wee descend to that part, which concerneth the Illustration Of Tradition, comprehended in that Science, which wee call Rhetoricke, Or Art Of Eloquence; A Science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value, it is inferiour to Wisedome, as it is sayd by God to Moses, when he disabled himselfe, for want of this Facultie, Aaron shall bee thy Speaker, and thou shalt bee to him as God: Yet with people it is the more mightie; For so Salomon sayth: Sapiens Corde appellabitur Prudens, sed dulcis Eloquio Maiora reperiet: Signifying that profoundnesse of Wisedome, will helpe a Man to a Name or Admiration; but that it is Eloquence, that prevayleth in an active life; And as to the labouring of it, the Emulation of Aristotle, with the Rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their Workes of Rhetorickes, exceede themselves. Againe, the excellencie of Examples of Eloquence, in the Orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the Precepts of Eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this Arte: And therefore, the Deficiences which I shall note, will rather bee in some Collections, which may as Hand-maydes attend the Art; than in the Rules, or use of the Art it selfe.

Notwithstanding, to stirre the Earth a little about the Rootes of this Science, as we have done of the rest; The dutie and Office of Rhetoricke is, To apply Reason to Imagination, for the better mooving of the will; For wee see Reason is disturbed in the Administration thereof by three meanes; by Illaqueation, or Sophisme, which pertaines to Logicke; by Imagination or Impression, which pertaines to Rhetoricke, and by Passion or Affection, which pertaines to Moralitie. And as in Negotiation with others; men are wrought by cunning, by Importunitie, and by vehemencie; So in this Negotiation within our selves; men are undermined by Inconsequences, sollicited and importuned, by Impressions or Obuersations: and transported by Passions: Neither is the Nature of Man so unfortunately built, as that those Powers and Arts should have force to disturbe Reason, and not to establish and advance it: For the end of Logicke, is to teach a fourme of Argument, to secure Reason, and not to entrappe it. The end of Moralitie, is to procure the Affections to obey Reason, and not to invade it. The end of Rhetoricke, is to fill the Imagination to second Reason, and not to oppresse it: for these abuses of Arts come in, but Ex oblique, for Caution.

And therfore it was great Injustice in Plate, though springing out of a just hatred of the Rhetoricians of his time, to esteeme of Rhetoricke, but as a voluptuarie Art, resembling it to Cookerie, that did marre wholsome Meates, and helpe unwholesome by varietie of sawces, to the pleasure of the tast. For wee see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evill: for there is no man but speaketh more honestly, than he can doe or thinke; And it was excellently noted by Thucidides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in Causes of estate; therefore hee was ever inveying against Eloquence, and good speech; knowing that no man can speake faire of Courses sordide and base. And therefore as Plato sayd elegantly: Th at vertue, if shee could be seen, would moove great love and affection: So seeing that she cannot bee shewed to the Sence, by corporall shape, the next degree is, to shewe her to the Imagination in lively representation: for to shewe her to Reason, only in subtilitie of Argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus, and many of the Stoykes, who thought to thrust vertue uppon men by sharpe disputations and Conclusions, which have no Sympathy with the will of Man.

Againe, if the affections in themselves were plyant and obedient to Reason, it were true, there shoulde bee no great use of perswasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and Proofes: but in regard of the continuall Mutinies and Seditions of the Affections:

Reason would become Captive and servile, if Eloquence of Perswasions, did not practise and winne the Imagination, from the affections part, and contract a Confederacie betweene the Reason and Imagination, against the Affections: For the Affections themselves, carrie ever an appetite to good, as Reason doth: The difference is, That the Affection beholdeth meerely the present; Reason behouldeth the future, and summe of time. And therefore, the Present, filling the Imagination more; Reason is commonly vanquished; But after that force of Eloquence and perswasion, hath made thinges future, and remote, appeare as present, than uppon the revolt of the Imagination, Reason prevayleth.

Wee conclude therefore, that Rhetoricke can bee no more charged, with the colouring of the worse part, than Logicke with Sophistrie, or Moralitie with Vice. For wee knowe the Doctrines of Contraries are the same, though the use be opposite: It appeareth also, that Logicke differeth from Rhetoricke, not onely as the fist, from the pawme, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that Logicke handleth Reason exacte, and in truth; and Rhetoricke handleth it, as it is planted in popular opinions and Manners: And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place Rhetoricke, as betweene Logicke on the one side, and Morall or Civile Knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for the Proofes and Demonstrations of Logicke, are toward all men indifferent, and the same: But the Proofes and perswasions of Rhetoricke, ought to differ according to the Auditors,

Which application, in perfection of Idea, ought to extend so farre: that if a Man should speake of the same thing to severall persons: he should speake to them all respectively and severall wayes: though this Politique part of Eloquence in private Speech, it is easie for the greatest Orators to want: whilest by the observing their well graced fourmes of speech, they leese the volubilitie of Application: and therefore,11De prudentia sermonis privati. it shall not be amisse to recommend this to better enquirie, not being curious, whether we place it heere, or in that part which concerneth Policie.

Nowe therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which (as I sayd) are but Attendances: and first, I doe not finde the Wisedome and diligence22Colores boni & mali, simplicis & comparati. of Aristotle well poursued, who began to make a Collection of the popular signes and colours of good and evill, both simple and comparative, which are as the Sophismes of Rhetoricke, (as I touched before.) For Example.

Sophisma.

Quod laudatur, bonum: Quod vituperatur, malum.

Redargutio.

Laudat uænales, qui vult extrudere merces.

Malum est, Malum est (inquit Emptor) sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur. The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: One, that there be but a few of many: another, that their Elenches are not annexed; and the third, that hee conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not onely in probation, but much more in Impression. For many fourmes are equall in Signification, which are differing in Impression: as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharpe, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same: for there is no man, but will be a little more raysed by hearing it sayd: Your enemies will be glad of this,

Than by hearing it sayd only, This is evill for you.

Secondly, I do resume also, that which I mentioned before, touching Provision or Præparatorie store, for the Furniture of speech, and readinesse of Invention; which appeareth to be of two sorts; The one in resemblance to a shoppe of peeces unmade up; the other to a shopp of thinges ready made up, both to be applyed to that which is frequent, and most in request; The former of these I will call Antitheta, & the latter Formulæ.

Antitheta are Theses argued, pro & contra, wherin men may be more large & laborious; but (in such as33Antitheta rerum. are able to doe it) to avoyd prolixity of entry, I wish the seedes of the severall arguments to be cast up into some briefe and acute sentences: not to bee cyted: but to bee as Skaynes or Bottomes of thread, to bee unwinded at large, when they come to be used: supplying authorities, and Examples by reference.

Pro verbis legis,

Pro sententia Legis.

Formulæ are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speeche, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects, as of Preface, Conclusion, Digression, Transition, Excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staire cases, entryes, doores, windowes, and the like, so in speeche, the conveyances and passages are of speciall ornament and effect.

A conclusion in a Deliberative.

So may we redeeme the faults passed & prevent the inconueniences future.