Good Active and Passive

To resume private or particular good; it falleth into the division of Good Active & Passive; For this difference of Good, (not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or houshold terms of Promus, and Condus,) is formed also in all things, & is best disclosed in the two severall Appetites in crea tures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, & the other to dilate or Multiply themselves; whereof the later seemeth to be the worthyer; For in Nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the A gent, and the earth, which is the lesse woorthye is the Patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater then that of foode. In divine Doctrine, Beatius est dare quam accipere: And in life there is no mans spirit so soft but estemeth the effecting of somwhat that he hath fixed in his desire more then sensuality which priority of the Active Good, is much upheld by the Consideration of our estate to be mortall & exposed to fortune: for, if wee mought have a perpetuity and Certainty in our pleasures the State of them would aduance their price. But when we see it is but Magni æstimamus Mori tardius and Ne glorieris de crastino. Nescis Partum diei it maketh us to desire to have somwhat secured and exempted from Time, which are onelye our deedes and works, as it is sayd Opera eorum sequuntur eos. The preheminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is naturall in man towardes variety and proceeding which in the pleasures of the sence which is the principal part of Passive good) can have no great latitude. Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris Cibus, Somnus Ludus per hunc Circulum curritur, mori velle non tantum fortis aut miser aut prudens sed etiam fastidiosus potest. But in enterprises, pursutes & purposes of life ther is much variety, wherof men are sensible with pleasure in theyr inceptions, progressions, recoyls, reintegrations, approches and atteynings to their ends. So as it was wel said: Vita sive proposito languida & vaga est. Neither hath this Active good and Identity with the good of Society though,, in some case, it hath an incidence into it: For although it do many times bring forth Acts of Beneficence yet it is with a respect private to a mans own power, glory, amplification, continuance: as appeareth plainly when it findeth a contrary Sùbiect For that Gygantine state of mind which possesseth the trowblers or the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and infinit other in smaller model who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or Enimies, and would give fourm to the world according to their owne humors (which is the true Theomachy) pretendeth and aspireth to Active good, though it recedeth furthest from good of Society which wee have determined to be the greater.

To resume Passive Good it receiveth a subdivision of Conservative and Perfective. For let us take a brief Review of that which we have said, we have spoken first of the Good of Society the intention whereof embraceth the Fourm of Humaine Nature, whereof we are members & Portions: and not our owne proper and Individual fourme: we haue spoken of Active good and supposed it as a part of Private and particu lar good. And rightly: For there is impressed uppon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves, one of preserving and contynuing theyr form, another of Advancing and Perfitting their fourm and a third of Multiplying and extending their fourme upon other things: whereof the multiplying er signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of Active good. So as there remayneth the conserving of it and parfiting or raising of it: which later is the highest degree of Passive good For to preserve in state is the lesse, to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man

Igneus est ollis vigor, & coelestis origo. His approach or Assumption to divine or Angellicall Nature, is the perfection of his forme, The error or false Imitation of which good is that whichis the tempest of humane life whileman upon the instinct of an advancement Formal. and Essential is carried to seek an advancement Locall For as those which are sick, & finde no remedy, doe tumble up and downe and chaunge place, as if by a Remove Locall, they could obtayne a Remoove Internall: So is it with men in ambition, when fayling of the meane to exalt their Nature, they are in a perpetuall estuation to exalte theyr Place. So then passive Good, is, as was sayde, eyther Conservative or Perfective.

To resume the good of conservation or Comforte, which consisteth in the frvicion of that which is agreeable to our Natures, it seemeth to be the most pure and Naturall of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiveth an difference, which hath neither beene well judged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed eyther in the Sincerenesse of the fruition, or in the quicknesse & vigor of it, the one superinduced by the Æquality, the o ther by Vicicitude: the one having lesse mixture of Evils the other more impression of Good. Whether of these, is the greter good, is a question controverted, but whether maus nature may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired.

The former question heing debated between Socrates, and a Sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equall and constant peace of mind; and the Sophist in much desiring, and much enjoying: they fell from Argument to ill words: The Sophist saying that Socrates felicity, was the felicity of a block or stone, and Socrates saying that the Sophists felicity, was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itche and skratch. And both these opinions, do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the generall consent, even of the Epicures themselves, that vertue beareth a great part in felicity: and if so, certain it is, that vertue hath more use in cleering perturbations, then in compassing desires. The Sophists opinion is much favoured, by the Assertion we last spake of, that good of Advancement, is greater then good of simple Preservation: because, every obtayning a desire, hath a shew of advancement, as mocion though in a Circle, hath a shew of progression.

But the second question, decided the true waye, maketh the former superfluous. For, can it be doubted, but that there are some, who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, then some other; and yet neverthelesse, are lesse troubled with the losse or leaving of them? So as this same; Non uti, ut non appetas: Non appetere, ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli & diffidentis. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the Philosophers are more fearefull and cautionary then the Nature of things requireth. So have they encreased the feare of death, in offering to cure it. For, when they would have a mans whole life, to be but a discipline or preparation to dye: they must needes make men thinke, that it is a terrible Enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the Poet,

So have they sought to make mens minds to uniforme and harmonicall, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary Motions: the reason whereof, I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated, to a pri uate, free, and unapplied course of life. For, as we see, upon the lute, or like Instrument, a Ground, though it be sweet, and have shew of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stoppes and passages, as a Set song, or Voluntary: much after the same Manner was the diversity betweene a Philosophicall and a civile life. And therefore men are to Imitate the wisedome of Jewellers, who, if there be a graine, or a cloude, or an ise which may be ground forth, without taking to much of the stone, they help it: but, if it should lessen and abate the stone to much they will not meddle with it: So ought men, so to procure Serenity, as they destroy not magnanimity.

Having therefore deduced the Good of Man, which is private & particular, as far as seemeth fit: wee will now returne to that Good of man, which respecteth and be beholdeth Society which we may terme Duty; bicause the term of duty is more propper to a minde well framed & disposed towards others, as the terme of vertue is applyed to a mind well formed & composed in it selfe, though neither can a man understand vertue without some relation to Society, nor duety without an inwarde disposition, This part may seem at first to pertaine to Science Civile and Politicke: but not if it be wel observed, For it concerneth the Rcgiment & government of every man, ouer himself, & not over others. And as in architectur, the direction framing the postes beames and other parts of building is not the same with the maner of joyning them and erecting the building: And in mechanicalls, the direction how to frame an Instrument or Engyne, is not the same with the manner of setting it on woorke and imploying it: and yet neverthelesse in expressing of the one, you incidently expresse the Aptnesse towardes the other: So the doctrine of Conjugation of men in Socyety, differereth from that of their conformity thereunto.

This part of Duty is sudivided into two parts: the common duty of every man, as a Man or member of a State: The other the respective or speciall duty of every man in his profession vocation and place: The first of these, is extant & wel laboured as hathbeen said. The second like wise I may report rather dispersed then deficient: which maner of dispersed writing in this kind of Argument, I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, vertue cha and right, of every severall vocation profession, and place. For although sometimes a Looker on may see more then a gamester and there be a Proverb more arrogant theu sound That the vale best discovereth the hill: yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really & materialy in their owne professions: & that the writing of speculative men of Active Matter, for the most part doth seeme to men of Experience as Phormioes Argument of the warrs seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreames and dotage. Onely there is one vice which accompanieth them, that write in their own professions that they magnify them in excesse, But generally it were to be wished, (as that which wold make learning indeed solide & fruitful) that Active men woold or could become writers

In which kind I cannot but mencion Honoris causa your Majesties exellent book touching the duty of a king: a woorke ritchlye compounded of Divinity Morality and Policy, with great aspersion of all other artes: & being in myne opinion one of the moste sound & healthful writings that I have read: not distempered in the heat of invention nor in the Couldnes of negligence: not sick of Dusinesse as those are who leese themselves in their order; nor of Conuulsions as those which Crampe in matters impertinent: not savoring of perfumes & paintings as those doe who seek to please the Reader more then Nature beareth, and chiefelye wel disposed in the spirits thereof, beeing agreeable to truth, and apt for actions: and farre remooved from that Naturall infirmity, whereunto I noted those, that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria, or Persia, in their extern glory: but a Moses, or a David, Pastors of their people, Neither can I ever leese out of my remembraunce, what I heard your Majesty, in the same sacred spirite of Government, deliver, in a great cause of Judicature which was: That Kings ruled by theyr lawes, as God did by the lawes of Nature, and ought as rarely to put in use theyr supreme Prerogative, as God doth his power of working Miracles. And yet notwithstandiug, in your book of a free Monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a King, as well as the Circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to alledge this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent example of Tractates, concerning speciall & respective dutyes: wherin I should have said as much, if it had beene written a thousand yeares since: Neither am I mooved with cer tain Courtly decencyes, which esteeme it flattery to prayse in presence. No, it is flattery to prayse in absence: that is, when eyther the vertue is absent, or the occasion is absent: and so the prayse is not Naturall, but forced, either in truth, or in time. But let Cicerobe read in his Oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent Table of Cæsars vertue, and made to his face, besides the example of many other excellent per sons, wiser a great deale then such observers: and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just prayses to present or absent.

But to return, there belongeth further, to the handling of this partie touching the duties of professions and vocations a Relative or opposite touching the fraudes cautels, impostures, & vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled. But howe? rather in a Satyre & Cinicaly, then seriously & wisely for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions then with Judgement to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For as Salomon saith. He that cometh to seeke after knowledg with a mind to scorne and censure, shalbe sure to finde matter for his humor but no matter for his Instruction. Quærenti derisori Scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed Studioso fit obuiam. But the managing of this argument with integrity & Truthe, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and vertue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the Basilisk, that if he see you first you die for it: but if you see him first, he dieth So is it with deceits and evill arts: which if they be first espied they leese their life, but if they preuent they indanger. So that we are much beholden to Macciavell & others that write what men doe and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to joyn serpentine wisedom with the Columbine Innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the Serpent: his basenesse and going upon his bellye, his volubility, and lubricity his envy and stinge, and the rest, that is al fourmes and Natures of evill - For without this vertue lyeth open and unfenced. Nay an honest man can doe no good uppon those that are wicked to reclaime them, without the helpe of the knowledge of euil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose, that honesty groweth out of Simplicitye of manners, and beleving of Preachers, schoolmasters, and Mens exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceive, that you know the ut most reaches of theyre owne corrupt opinions, they despise all moralitye. Nos recipit stultus verba prudentiæ, nisi ca dixeris, quæ versantur in Corde eius.

Unto this part touching Respective duty, doth also appertayne the dutyes betweene husband and wife, parent and childe, Master and Servant: So likewise, the lawes of friendship and Gratitude, the civile bond of Companyes, Colledges, and Politike bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties: not as they ar parts of Government and Society, but as to the framing of the minde of particular persons.

The knowledge concerning good respecting Society doth handle it also not simply alone but Comparatively whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties, betwen person and person, Case and Case, particular & publike: As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus, against his own Sons, which was so much extolled yet what was sayd?

Infaelix, ut cunque serent ea fata Minores.

So the case was doubtfull, and had opinion on both sides: Againe we see, when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certaine, whose opinions they meant to feele, whether they were fit to be made their Associates, and cast foorth the question touching the Killing of a Tyrant being an usurper they wer devided in opinion, some holding, that Servitude was the Extreame of Evils; and others, that Tyranny was better, then a Civile war: and a number of the like cases there are, of comparative duty. Amongst which, that of all others, is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deale of good to ensue of a small Injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth; Aliqua sunt iniustè facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint. But the reply is good; Authorem præsentis Justititiæ habes sponsorem futuræ non habes; Men must pursue things which are just in presente, and leave the future to the divine providence: So then we passe on from this generall part touching the Exemplar and description of Good.