The Culture of the Mind

Now therefore, that we have spoken of this fruite of life, it remaineth to speake of the Husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part, the former11De cultura, Animi. seemeth to be no better then a faire Image, or statua, which is beautifull to contemplate, but is without life and mocion: whereunto Aristotle himselfe subscribeth in these words: Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, & quid sit, & ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim sere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendæ autem eius modos & vias ignorare Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quærendum est, sed & quomodo sui copiam faciat, utrunque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse & eius compotes fieri: Hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus & ex quibus & quo modo. In such full wordes and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: So saith Cicero in great Commendation of Cato the second, that he he had applyed him self to Philosophy. Non ita disputandi Causa, sed ita vivendi. And although the neglect of our tymes wherein few men doe houlde any Consultations touching the reformation of theire life (as Seneca excellently saith, Departibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summa nemo) may make this part seem superfluous: yet I must Conclude with that Aphorism of Hypocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, ijs mens ægrotat. They neede medicine not onely to asswage the disease but to awake the sense And if it be saide, that the cure of mens Mindes belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true: But yet Morall Philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servaunt, and humble handmaide. For as the Psalme saith, That the eyes of the handmayde looke perpetually towardes the mistresse, and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmayde, to discerne of the mistresse will: So ought Morall Philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of Divinity, and yet so as it may yeeld of her selfe (within due limits) Many sound and profitable directions.

This Part therefore, because of the excellency therof, I cannot but find exceeding strange, that it is not reduced to written enquiry, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant, and such wherein the common talke of men (which is rare, but yet commeth sometimes to passe) is wiser then their Bookes: It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the woorthinesse, and because we may acquite our selves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves, that have written. We wil therfore enumerate some heads or Points thereof, that it may appeare the better what it is, and whether it be extant,

First therefore in this, as in all things, which ar practicall, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not: for the one may be dealte with by waye of alteration, but the other by waye of application onely. The husbandman cannot command, neither the Nature of the Earth, nor the seasons of the weather: no more can the Physition the constitution of the patiente, nor the varietye of Accidentes. So in the Culture and Cure of the mynde of Man, two thinges are without our commaund: Poyntes of Nature, and pointes of Fortune. For to the Basis of the one, and the Conditions of the other, our worke is limited and tied. In these thinges therefore, it is left unto us, to proceede by application, Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo: and so likewise vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo. But, when that wee speake of sufferinge, wee doe not speake of a dull, and neglected sufferinge, but of a wise and industrious sufferinge, which draweth, and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that property which we cal, Accomodating or Applying. Now the wisedome of Application resteth principally in the exact & distinct knowledge of the precedent state, or disposition, unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except wee first take measure of the Body.

So then the first Article of this knowlede is to set downe Sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters & tempers of mens Natures and dispositions specially having regard to those differences which are most radicall in being the fountayns and Causes of the rest or most frequent in Concurrence or Commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a fewe of them in passage the better to describe the Mediocrities of vertues that can satisfie this intention for if it deserve to be considered That there are minds which are proportioned to great mattes, & others to smal, (Which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by the name of Magnaminity) doth it not deserve as well to be Considered. That there are mindes proportioned to intend many matters and others to few? So that some can devide them selves others can perchance do exactly wel, but it must bee but in fewe things at once; And so there cometh to bee a Narrownes of mind as wel as a Pusillanimity. And againe, That some mindes are proportioned to that which may bee dispatched at once or within a short return of time: others to that which begins a farre of, and is to be won with length of pursute,—Jam tum tenditque fovetque; So that there may be fitly said to be a long animity which is Comonly also ascribed to God as a Magnanimity So further deserved it to be consideted, by Aristotle That there is a disposition in Conversation (supposing it in things which doe in no sort tonch or concerne a mans selfe) to soothe and please; And a disposition contrary to Contradict and Crosse; And deserveth it not much better to be considered, That there is a disposition, not in conversation or talke, but in matter of mere serious Nature (and supposing it still in things meerly indifferent) to take pleasure in the good of another, and adisposition contrarywise, to take distast at the good of another; which is that properly, which we call good Nature, or ill Nature, benignity or Malignity: And therefore I cannot sufficiently Marvayle, that this parte of knowledge touching the severall Characters of Natures and dispositions should bee omitted both in Morality and policy, considering it is of so great Ministery, and suppeditation to them both A man shall find in the traditions of Astrology, som prety and apt divisions of mens Natures according to the predominances of the Planets; Lovers of Quiet Lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of Honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of Arts, lovers of Change, and so forth: A man shall find in the wisest sort of these Relations, which the Italians make touching Conclaves, the Natures of the severall Cardinalls, handsomlye and lively painted fourth: A man shall meete with in every dayes Conference the denominations of Sensitive, dry, formall, reall, humorous, certayne, Humo di Prima impressione, Huomo di ultima impressione, and the like, and yet neverthelesse this kind of observations wandreth in wordes, but as not fixed in Enquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them) but we conclude no precepts upon them, wherein our faulte is the greater, because both History, Poesye, and daylie experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow, whereof wee make a few poesies, to hould in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that Receits mought be made of them for use of life.

Of much like kinde are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed upon the Mind by the Sex, by the Age, by the Region, by health, and sicknesse, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent, and not externe: and again those which are caused by extern fortune: as Soveraygnty, Nobility, obscure birth, ritches, want, Magistracye, privatenesse, prosperity, adversity, Constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like: And therefore we see, that Plautus maketh it a wonder, to see an oulde man beneficent, Benignitas huius ut adolescentuli est: Saint Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, Increpa eos durè, upon the disposition of their Country Cretenses semper mendaces, malæ Bestiæ, ventres pigri. Salust noteth, that it is usuall with Kinges to desire Contradictoryes, sed plerunque Regiæ voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, fic mobiles, sæpeque ipsæ sibi adversæ. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, solus Vespasianus, mutatus in melius, Pindarus maketh an observation, that greate and suddaine fortune for the most parte defeateth men Qui magnam foelicitatem concoquere non possunt: So the Psalme sheweth it is more easie to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, then in the increase of fortune. Divitiæ si affluant, nolite Cor apponere: These observations and the like, I denye not, but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetoricks, and are handled in some scattered discourses, but they were never incorporate into Morall Philosophy, to which they doe essentiallye appertayne: as the knowledg of the diversitye of groundes and Mouldes doth to Agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of Complexions and Constitutions doth to the Phisition; except we meane to follow the indiscretion of Empe riques, which minister the same medicines to all patients.

Another Article of this knowledge is the Inquirye touching the affections: for as in Medicining of the body it is in order first to know the divers Complexions and constitutions, secondlye the diseases, and lastlye the Cures: So in medicining of the Minde, after knowledge of the divers Characters of mens natures, it foloweth in order to know the diseases and infirmites of the mind, which ar no other then the perturbations & distempers of the affections. For as the aunciente in politiques in populer Estates were woont to Compare the people to the sea, and the Orators to the winds because as the sea would of it selfe be caulm and quiet, if the windes did not moove and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious ora tors did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumulte and perturbation. And here againe I find straunge, as before, that Aristotle shoulde have written divers volumes of Ethiques, and never handled the affections, which is the principall subject thereof, and yet in his Retoricks where they are considered but collaterally, & in a second degree, (as they may be mooved by speech) he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and paine that can satisfie this inquiry, no more then hee that should generally handle the nature of light can bee said to handle the nature of Colours: for pleasure and paine are to the particuler affections as light is to particular collours: Better travailes I suppose had the Stoicks taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which wee have at second hand: But yet it is like, it was after their manner rather in subtiltye of definitions (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities) then in active and ample descriptions and observations: so likewise I finde some particular writings of an elegant nature touching some of the affections, as of Auger, of Comforte upon adverse accidentes, of Tendernesse of Countenance and other. But the poets and writers of Histories are the best Doctors of this knowledge, where we may finde painted fourth with greate life, How affections are kindled and incyted: and how pacified and refrai ned: and how againe Conteyned from Act, & furder degree: how they disclose themselves, how they work how they varye, how they gather and fortifie, how they are inwrapped one within another, and howe they doe fighte and encounter one with another, and other the like particularityes: Amongst the which this last is of speciall use in Morall and Civile matters: howe I say to sett affection againste affection, and to Master one by another, euen as wee use to hunt beast with beaste, and flye byrde with birde, which otherwise percase wee coulde not so easily recouer: upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of Præmium and pana. whereby Civile states Consist, imploying the predominante affections of feare and hope, for the suppressing and brideling the rest. For as in the governemente of states, it is sometimes necessarye to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the governmente within.

Now Come we to those poynts which are within our owne command and have force and operacion upon the mind to affect the wil & Appetite & to alter Manners: wherin they ought to have handled Custome Exercise, Habit, Educacion, example, Imitation, Emulation Company, Frinds, praise, Reproofe, exhortation, fame, lawes, Bookes, studyes: theis as they have determinate use, in moraliryes, from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts & Regiments compounded & described, as may seeme to recover or preserve the health and Good estate of the mind, as farre as pertaineth to humane Medycine: of which number wee will visit upon som one or two as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore wee doe resume Custome and habite to speake of.

The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to mee a negligent opinion. That of those thinges which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custome, using for example: That if a stone bee throwne ten thousande tymes. up, it wil not learne to assend, and that by, often seeing or hearing, wee doe not learne to see or heare the better. For thoughe this principle bee true in things wherein nature is Peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot nowe stande to discusse) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he moughtsee that a streight glove wil come more easily on with use, and that a wand will by use bend otherwise then it grewe: and that by use of the voice wee speake lowder and stronger, and that by use of enduring heate or coulde, we endure it the better, and the like: which later sort have a neerer resemblance unto that subject of Manners he handleth then those instances which he alledgeth; But allowing his Conclusion that vertues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habite: for there bee many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the minde, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, wherof we wil recite a fewe.

The first shal bee, that wee beware wee take not at the first either to High a strayne or to weake: for if, too Highe in a different nature you discorage, in a confident nature, you breede an opinion of facility, and so a sloth, and in all natures you breede a furder expectation then can hould out, and so an insatisfaction on the end, if to weake of the ether side: you may not looke to performe and overcome any great taske.

Another precept is to practise all thinges chiefly at two severall times, the one when the mind is beste disposed, the other when it is worste disposed: that by the one you may gaine a great step, by the other you may worke out the knots and Stondes of the mind, and make the middle times rhe more easily and pleasant.

Another precept is, that which Aristotle mencioneth by the way, which is to beare ever towards the Contrary extreame of that whereunto we are by Nature inclyned: like unto the Rowing against the stream or making a wand straight by bynding him Contrary to his natural Crookednesse.

Another precept is, that the mind is brought to any thing better and with more sweetnesse and happinesse, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention but Tanquam aliud agendo, because of the Naturall hatred of the minde against necessity and Constraint. Many other Axiomes there are touching the Managing of Exercise and custome: which being so Conducted, doth proove indeed another nature: but being governed by chance, doth commonly proove but an ape of nature, & bringeth forth that which is lame and Counterfette.

So if wee shoulde handle bookes and studies and what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of greate caution and direction appertaining thereunto? did not one of the fathers in greate indignation call Poesy vinum Demonum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations and vaine opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded wherein he saith, That young men are no fitte auditors of Moral Philosophy, because they are not setled from the boyling heate of their affections, nor attempered with Time and experience? and doth it not hereof come that those excellent books and discourses of the aunciente writers, (whereby they have perswaded unto vertue most effectually, by representing her in state and Majesty, and populer opinions against vertue in their Parasites Coates, fitt to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not red & revolved by men in their mature and setled yeares, but confined almost to boyes & beginners? But is it not true also that much lesse, young men are fit auditors of Matters of Policy, till they have beene throughly seasoned in religion & Morality, least their Judgementes be corrupted, and made apt to thinke that there are no true Differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it. Prosperum et Fœlix scelus virtus vocatur: And Againe Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, Hic diadema: which the Poets do speak satyrically and in indignation on vertues behalfe: But books of pollicie doe speake it seriously, and positively, for so it pleaseth Machiavell to say That if Cæsar had bene overthrowne, he woulde have beene more odious then ever was Catiline; as if there had beene noe difference but in fortune, between a very fury of lust & bloud, and the most excellent spirit (his ambicion reserved) of the world? Again is there not a Caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of Moralities themselves (some kindes of them) leaste they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible, as Cicero saith of Cato in Marco Catone. Hæc bona quæ videmus divina & egregia ipsius scitote esse propria: quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea, sunt omnia, non a naturâ sed a Magistro? Many other Axiomes & advises there are touching those proprieties & effects, which studies doe infuse & instil into maners: And so likewise is there touchinge the use of all those other points of Company: fame, lawes and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of Morality.

But there is a kind of Culture of the Mind; that semeth yet more accurate & elaborate then the rest & is built upon this ground: That the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfite, and at oother tymes in a state more depraved. The purpose therfore of this practise is to fixe and cherishe the good howers of the mind and to obliterate and take fourth the Evil: The fixing of the good hath bene practised by two meanes, vowes or Constant resolutions, and observances, or exercises which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keepe the mynd in continual obedience. The obliteration of the Evill hath been practised by two Meanes, some kind of Redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an Inception or account de Novo, for the time to come: but this part, seemeth sacred and religious, and Justly: for all good Morall Philosophy (as was said,) is but an handmaide to Religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last pointe which is of all other meanes the moste compendious and summarye, and againe, the moste noble and effectual to the reducing of the minde unto vertue and good estate: which is the electing and propounding unto a mans selfe good & vertuous ends of his life, such as may bee in a reasonable sorte within his Compas to attaine. For if these two things be sup osed: that a maset before him honest & Good ends, and againe that he bee resolute, Constant, and true unto them; it will follow that hee shall Moulde himselfe into al vertue at once: and this is indeede like the worke of nature, whereas the other course, is like the worke of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, hee shapes onely that parte whereupon hee worketh, as if hee bee upon The face that parte which shal bee the body is but a rude stone stil, til such times as hee comes to it. But contrarywise when Nature makes a flower or living creature, shee fourmeth rudiments of all the parts at one time; so in obtaining ver tue by habite, while a man practiseth Temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; But when he dedicateth & applyeth himselfe to good ends, loke what vertue soever the pursute and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conforme himselfe thereunto: which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently expresse himself, that it ought not to bee called vertuous, but Divine: his words are these; Immanitati autem consentaneum est, opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem. And a little after; Nam ut feræ, neque vitium, neque virtus est sic neque Dei. Sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio. And therfore we may see what Celsitud of honor Plinius secundus attributeth to Traiane in his funerall oration, where he said. That men needed to make noe other praiers to the Gods, but that they woulde Continue as good Lords to them, as Traiaine had beene: as if he had not beene onely an Imitation of divine nature, but a patterne of it. But these be heathen & prophane passages hauing but a shadowe of that divine state of mind, which Religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto; by imprinting upon their soules Charity which is exellently called the bond of Perfection: bicause it comprehendeth & fastneth al vertues together. And it is elegantly said by Menander of vaine love which is but a false Imitation of divine love. Amor melior Sophista, Lavo ad humanam vitam, that Love teacheth a man to Carry himselfe better, then the Sophist or Præceptor, which he calleth Left handed, because with all his rules & preceptions he cannot form a man so Dexteriously, nor with that facility to prize himself & govern himself as love can do: So certainly if a mans mind be truly inflamd with charity it doth work himsodainly into greter perfection then al the Doctrin of moralitye can doe, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay furder as Xenophon obserued truely that all other affections though they raise the minde, yet they doe it by distorting, and uncomlinesse of extasies or excesses; but onely Love doth exalt the mind, and neverthelesse; at the same instant doth settle and Compose it, So in all other excellencyes though they advance nature yet they are subject to Excesse. Onely Charity admitteth noe Excesse; for soe we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the Angells transgressed and fel: Ascendam, & ero similis altissimo: By aspiringe to be like God in knowledge man transgressed and fell. Eritis sicut Dii scientes bovum & malum; But by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodnesse or love, neyther Man nor Angell ever transgressed or shall transgresse. For unto that imitation wee are called, Diligite inimicos vestros, Benefacite eis qui odernut vos, & orate pro persequentibus & Calumniantibus vos ut sitis filii patris vestri qui in coelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos & malos, & pluit super justos & iniustos. So in the first platfourme of the divine Nature it self, the heathen Religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus, and the sacred scriptures thus, Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius.

Wherefore I doe conclude this part of Morall knowledge concerning the Culture and Regiment of the Mind, wherin if any man considering the parts therof, which I have enumerated, doe judge, that my labor is but to Collect into an Art or Science, that which hath bin pretermitted by others, as matter of common Sence, and experience, he judgeth well: But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes: you may not marvaile (A thenians) that Demosthenes and I doe differ, for hee drinketh water, and I drinke wine: and like as wee reade of an aunciente parable of the two gates of sleep.

So if wee put on sobriety and attention, we shall finde it a sure Maxime in knowledge: that the more pleasaunte Liquor (of Wine) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate of Ivorye, sendeth foorthe the falser dreames.

But we have now concluded, That generall part of Humane Philosophye, which contemplateth man segregate, and as hee consisteth of bodye and spirite; Wherein wee maye further note, that there there seemeth to be a Relation or Conformity betwen the good of the mynd, and the good of the Body. For as we deuided the good of the body into Health, Beau ty, strength, and Pleasure, so the good of the mynde inquired in Rationall and Morall knoweledges tendeth to this, to make the minde sound, and without perturbation, Beautifull and graced with decencie: and Strong and Agill for all duties of life. Theis three as in the bodye, so in the minde seeldome meete, and Commonly sever: For it is easilye to observe, that many have Strength of witte and Courage, but have neither Healthe from perturbations, nor any Beauty or decencie in theire doings: som againe have an Elegancy and finenesse of Carriage, which have neither soundnesse of honestie, nor substance of sufficiencye: And some againe have honest and refourmed Myndes that can neither become themselves nor Manage Businesse, and sometimes two of them meete, and rarely all three: As for pleasure, wee have likewise determined, that the minde oughte not to bee reduced to stupide, but to retayne pleasure: Confined rather in the subject of it, then in the strength and vigor of it.