Civile Knowledge

Civile knowledge is conuersant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to Actiome. Neverthelesse, as Cato the Censor saide, That the Romane; were like sheepe, for that a man were better drive a flock of them, then one of them; For in a flocke, if you could get but some fewe goe righte, the rest would follow: So in that respect Morall philosophie is more difficile then Pollicie. Againe, morrall Philosophye propoundeth to it selfe the framing of Internall goodnesse: But civile knowledge requireth onelye an Externall goodnesse: for that as to societye sufficeth: And therfore it cometh oft to passe that therebe Evill Times in good governments: for so we finde in the holy story when the kings were good, yet it is added. Sed adhuc populus non dixerat cor suum ad dominum Deumpatrum suorum. Againe States as great Engines moove slowly, and are not so soone put out of frame: for as in Ægypt the seaven good years sustained the seaven badde: So governments for a time well grounded doe beare out errors following. But the resolution of particuler persons is more so dainly sub verted, These respects doe somwhat qualifie the extreame difficulty of civile knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts according to the three summary Actions of society, which are, Conuersation, Negotiation and Government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use and Protection: & theybe three wisedoms of divers natures, which do often sever: wisedome of the behaviour, wisedom of Businesse; & wisedome of state.

The wisedome of of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much lesse despised: for it hath not onely an honour in it selfe, but an influence also into businesse and government; The poet saieth.

Nec vultu destrue verba tuo. A man maie destroy the force of his woords with his countenance: so may he of his deeds saieth Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy accesse, Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum.

It is nothing wonne to admitte men with an open doore, and to receive them with a shutte and reserved countenaunce. So wee see Atticus, before the first interviewe betweene Cæsar and Cicero, the warre depending, did seriouslye advise Cicero touching the composing and orderinge of his countenaunce and gesture. And if the governemente of the countenaunce bee of such effecte, much more is that of the speeche, and other carriage appertayning to conversation; the true modele whereof seemeth to mee well expressed by Ltuye, though not meante for this purpose; Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius, quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis obliti, alterum suæ: The summe of behavioure is to retayne a mans owne dignitye, without intruding upon the libertye of others: on the other side, if behavioure and outwarde carriage bee intended too much, first it may passe into affection, and then Quid deformius quam Scænam in vitam transferre, to acte a mans life? But although it proceede not to that extreame, yet it consumeth time, and imployeth the minde too much. And therefore as wee use to advise younge studentes from company keeping, by saying, Amici, fures Temporis: So certainely the Intending of the discretion of behavioure is a great Theefe of Meditation: Againe, such as are accomplished in that howr of urbanity, please themselves in name, and sildome aspire to higher vertue: whereas those that have defect in it, do seeke Comlines by Reputation: for where reputacion is, almost every thing becommeth: But where that is not, it must be supplied by Puntos and Complementes: Agayne, there is no greater impediment of Action, then an overcurious observaunce of decency, and the guide of decencye, which is Tyme and season. For as Salomon sayeth, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat, & qui respicit ad nubes, non metet: A man must make his opportunity, as ofte as finde it. To conclude; Behaviour seemeth to me as a Garment of the Minde, and to have the Condicions of a Garmente. For it ought to bee made in fashion: it ought not to bee too curious: It ought to bee shaped so, as to sette foorthe anye good making of the minde: and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too straighte, or restrayned for exercise or mocion. But this parte of Civile knowledge hath beene elegantlye handled, and therefore I cannot reporte it for deficient.

The wisedome touching Negotiation or businesse hath not bin hitherto collected into writing to the great derogacion of learning, and the professors of learninge. For from this roote springeth chiefly that note or opinion which by us is expressed in Adage, to this effecte: That there is noe greate concurrence betweene learning and Wisedome. For of the three wisedomes which wee have sette downe to pertaine to civil life, for wisedome of Behaviour, it is by learned men for the moste parte despised, as an Inferiour to Vertue and and an Enemy to Meditacion; for wisedome of Governmente they acquite themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to fewe. But for the wisedome of Businesse wherein mans life is moste conversant, there bee noe Bookes of it, excepte some fewe scattered advertisementes, that have noe proportion to the magnitude of this subjecte. For if bookes were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with meane experience, woulde farre excell men of longe experience withoute learning, and outshoote them in their owne bowe.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowlddge shoulde bee so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much lesse infinite then science of Governmente, which wee see is laboured and in some parte reduced. Of this wisedome it seemeth some of the auncient Romanes in the saddest and wisest times were professors: for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use. For Senators that had name and opinion, for generall wisemen as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius and manie others; to walke at certaine howers in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use their advise, and that the particuler Citizens would resort unto them, and consulte with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the imploying of a sonne, or of a purchase or bargaine, or of an accusation and every other occasion incident to mans life; so as there is a wisedome of Counsaile and advise even in private Causes: arisinge out of an universall insight into the affayrs of the world, which is used indeede upon particuler cases propounded but is gathered by generall obser, uation of causes of like nature. For so wee see in the Booke which Cicero writeth to his brother De petitione consultatus, (being the onely booke of businesse that I know written by the auncients) although it concerned a particuler action then on foote, yet the substance thereof consisteth of manie wise and pollitique Axioms which containe not a temporary, but a perpetuall direction in the case of popular Elections; But chiefly wee may see in those Aphorismes which have place amongest Diuine writings composed by Salomon the King, of whom the scriptures testifie that his hearte was as the sandes of the sea, incompassing the world and all worldly matters we see I saie, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much varietie of occasions; whereupon wee will staie a while offering to consideracion some number of Examples.

Sed & eunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur, ne accommodes aurem tuam, uè fortè audiaes servum tuum maledicentem tibi. Heere is concluded the providente staye of enquiry, of that which we wolde be loathe to finde: as it was judged greate wisedome in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius papers unperused.

Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascaetur, sive rideat, uon inveniet requiem. Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person then himselfe, which is such an ingagemente, as whether a man turne the matter to jeast, or turne it to heate; or howsoever hee change copye, hee can no wayes quitte himselfe well of it.

Qui delicatè à pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem. Heere is signified that if a man beginne too highe a pitche in his favoures, it doeth commonlye end in unkindnesse, and unthankfulnesse.

Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo, coram regibus stabit nec erit inter ignobiles. Here is observed that of all vertues for rising to honoure, quicknesse of dispatche is the best; for superiours many times love not to have those they imploy too deep, or too sufficient, but redy and diligent.

Vidi cunctos viventes, qui ambulant sub sole cum adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occidentem vel meridianum.

Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia Curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima. Here caution is given that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth thinges at worst, and depriveth himselfe of meanes to make them better.

Erat Civitas parva pauci in ea viri; venit contra eam rex magnus, & vadavit eam, instrxuitque munitiones per Gyrum, & perfecta est obsidio inventusquæ est in ea vir pauper & sapiens, & liberavit eam per sapientiam suam, & nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis; Here the corruptions of states is sette foorh; that esteeme not vertue or merite longer then they have use of it.

Mollis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that silence or rough Answeare, exasperateth: but an answear present and temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum, quasisepes spinarum. Here is livelie represented how laborious sloth prooveth in the end; for when thinges are differred till the laste instant, and nothing prepared before hande, everye stepp findeth a Bryer or Impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is taxed the vanitie of formall speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, then upon the conclusions and issues of speache.

Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit, iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem. Here is noted that a judge were better be a briber, then a respecter of persons: for a corrupt Judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes, similis est imbri vehementi, in quo paratur fames; here is expressed the extreamity of necessitous extortions, figured in the aunciente fable of the full and the hungry horseleech.

Fons turbatus pede, & vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio: here is noted that one judiciall and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountaines of Justice more, then many particuler Injuries passed ouer by connivence.

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre & a matre, & dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidij; here is noted that whereas men in wronging theyr best frindes, use to extenuat: their faulte, as if they moughte presume or bee bolde upon them, it doth contrariwise indeede aggravate their fault, & turneth it from Injury to impiety.

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso; here caution is given that in the election of our friends wee doe principalliy auoide those which are impatiente, as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarels.

Qui conturbat domum suam possidebit ventum: here is noted that in domesticall separations & breaches men doe promise to themselves quietting of theire minde and contentemente, but still they are deceiued of theire expectation, and it turneth to winde.

Filius sapiens lætificat patrem, filius vero stultus mæstitia est matri sueæ. Here is distinguished that fathers have moste comforte of the good proose of of their sonnes; but mothers have moste discomfort of their ill proofe, because women have little discerninge of vertue but of fortune.

Qui celat delictum quærit amicitiam, sed qui altero sermone repetit, seperat fæderatos; here caution is given that reconcilemente is better managed by an Amnesty and passing over that which is past, then by Apologies and excusations.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia, ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas: here is noted that words and discourse aboundeth moste, where there is idlenesse and want.

Primus in sua causa justus, sed venit altera pars, & inquiret in eum; Heare is observed that in all causes the first tale possesseth much, in sorte, that the prejudice, thereby wrought wil bee hardly remooved, ex cepte some abuse or falsitie in the Information be detected.

Verba blinguis quasi simplicia, & ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris; there is distinguished that flatterye and insinuation which seemeth set and artificiall, sinketh not farre, but that entreth deepe, which hath shewe of nature, libertie, and simplicity,

Qui erudit deriso rem, ipse sibi iniuriam facit & qui arguit Impium sibi maculam geri t. Here caution is given howe wee tender reprehension to arrogante and scornefull natures, whose manner is to esteeme it for contumely, and accordingly ro retourne, it,

Da sapienti occasionem & addetur ei sapientia, Here is distinguished the wisedome broughte into habite, and that which is but verball and swimming onely in conceite: for the one upon the occasione presented is quickned and redoubled: the other is amazed and confused.

Quo modo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifestasunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glasse, wherein the Images of all diversitie of Natures & Customs are represented, from which representation proceedeth that application,

Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit,

Thus have I staide some what longer upon these sentences pollitique of Salomon, then is agreable to the proportion of an example: ledde with a desire to give authority to this parte of knoweledge, which I noted as deficiente by so excellente a presidente: : and have also attended them with briefe observations, such as to my understandinge, offer noe violence to the sence, though I knowe they may bee applyed to a more divine use: But it is allowed even in divinity, that some Interpretations, yea and some writings have more of the Eagle, then others: But takinge them as Instructions for life, they moughte have received large discourse, if I woulde have broken them and illustrated them by diducements and examples.

Neither was this in use only with the hebrews, But it is generally to be found in the wisdome of the more auncient Times: that as men founde out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and expresse it in parable. or Aphorisme, or fable. But for fables they were vicegerents & supplies, where Examples failed: Nowe that the times abounde with historie, the Ayme is better when the marke is alive. And therefore the fourme of writing which of al others is fittest for this variable argu mente of Negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for Governmente: namely discourse upon Histories or Examples. For knoweledge drawne freshly and in our view out of particulers, knoweth the waie best to particulers againe. And it hath much greater life for practise: when the discourse attendeth upon the Example, then when the example attenddeth upon the discourse. For this is no pointe of order as it seemeth at firste but of substance. For when the Example is the grounde being set downe in an history at large, it is set down with al circumstances: which manye sometimes controul the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it; as a verie patterne for gaine; wheras the Examples alledged for the discourses sake, are cited succinctly, and with out particularity, and carry a servile aspecte towards the discourse, which they are broughte in to make good.

But this difference is not amisse to bee remembred, that as historye of Tymes is the best grounde for discourse of Governemente, such as Machyavel handleth; so Histories of Lives is the moste proper for discourse of businesse is more conuersante in private Actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose, fitter then them both which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weightie, as manie are of Cicero ad Atticum and others. For letters have a greate and more particuler representation of businesse, then either Chronicles or Lives, Thus have wee spoken both of the matter and fourme of this patte of Civile knowledge touching Negotiation, which wee note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that wherofwe have spoké as sapere, & sibi Sapere: the one mooving as it were to the circum rence, the other to the center: for there is awisedome of counsell, and againe there is a wisedome of pressing a mans owne fortune; and they doe sometimes meet, and often severe. For many are wise in their owne ways, that are weak for governmente or Counsell, like Ants which is a wise creature for it self, but very hurtefull for the garden- This wisedome the Romanes did take much knoweledge of, Nam polsapiens (saith the Comicall Poet) Fingit fortunam sibi, and it grewe to an adage, Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ : and Livie attributeth it to Cato the first, In hoc viro tanta vis animi & ingenij inerat, ut quocunque Loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam sacturus videre tur.

This conceit or position if it bee too much declared and professed, hath beene thoughte a thinge impolitique and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian: who havinge done manie greate services to the Estate in his government and givinge an accounte thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude every particuler with this Clause, And in this fortune had noe part And it came so to passe that hee never prospered in any thinge hee tooke in hande afterwarde: for this is too high and too arrogant sauouring of that which Ezechiel saith of Pharaoh: Dicis: fluvius est meus & ego feci memet ipsum: or of that which another prophette speaketh: That men offer Sacrifices to theire nettes and snares, and that which the Poett expresseth,. Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod inutile libro.

For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed. And therefore those that were great Pollitiques indeede ever ascribed their succcesses to their felicitie: and not to theire skill or vertue. For so Sylla surnamed himselfe Foelix, not Magnus So Cæsar saide to the Maister of the shippe, Cæsarem portas & fortunam eius.

But yet neverthelesse these Positions Faber quisque fortunæ suæ, sapiens dominabitur astris: Invia virtuti nullaest via, and the like, being taken and used as spurs to Industry, and not as stirops to insolency rather for resolution then for the presumption or outwarde declaration, have beene ever thoughte sounde and good, and are no question imprinted in the greatest mindes: who are so sensible of this opinion, as they causcarce containe it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar( who was rather diverse from his uncle, then, inferiour in vertue) how when he died, he desiered his friénds aboute him to give him a Plaudite: as if hee were consciente to himselfe that he had played his parte wel upon the stage. This parte of knowledge we doe reporte also as deficient: not but that it is practised too much, butit hath not beene reduced to writinge. And therefore least it shoulde seme to any that it is not comprehensible by Axiome, It is requisite as wee did in the former, that wee set down some11Faber Fortunæ sive de Am. bitu vitæ. heads or passages of it.

Wherein it maye appeare at the first a newe and unwoonted Argumente to teach men how to raise and make theire fortune a doctrine wherein every man perchance will bee ready to yeeld himselfe a disciple til he seethe difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as vertue; and it is as harde and seuere a thinge to bee a true Pollitique, as to be truelye morall. But the handlinge hereof, concerneth learning greatly, both in honour, and in substance: In honour, because pragmaticall men may not goe away with an opinion that learning is like a Larke that can mount, and singe, and please her selfe, and nothing else; but may knowe that she houldeth as well of the hauke that can soare aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the pray. In substance, because it is the perfite lawe of enquiry of trueth, That nothing bee in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of Crystall, or Fourme, that is, that there be not any thing in being & action, which should not bee drawne and collected into contemplation and doctrine: Neyther doth learning admire or esteeme of this Architecture of fortune, otherwise then as of an inferiour worke; For no mans fortune can be an end woorthy of his being, and many times the woorthiest men doe abandon theyr fortune willingly for better respects: but neverthelesse fortune as an organ of vertue and merit deserveth the consideration.

First therefore the precept which I conceive to bee most summary, towardes the prevayling in fortune; is to obtaine that windowe which Momus did require, who seeing in the frame of mans heart, such Angles and recesses, founde fault there was not a windowe to looke into them: that is, to procure good informacions of particulars touching persons, their Natures, their desires & ends, their customs and fashions, theyr helpes and advantages, and wherby they cheefly stand; so againe their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lye most open and obnoxious, their friendes, factions, dependaunces: and againe theyr opposites, enviors, competitors, theyr moods, and times, Sola viri molles adytus, & temporanoras theyr principles, rules, and observacions: and the like; And this not onely of persons, but of actions: what are on foote from time to time: and how they are con ducted, favoured, opposed; and how they importe: and the like; For the knowledge of present Actions, is not onely materiall in itselfe, but without it also, the knowledge of persons is very erronious: for men chaunge with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuite, they are one, and when they retourne to theyr Nature, they are another. These Informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syl logisme, for no excellencye of obseruacions (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our surety who sayeth. Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens exhauriet illud: And although the knowledge it selfe falleth not under precept, because it is of Individuals, yet the Instructions for the obtaining of it may.

We will beginne therefore with this precept, according to the aunciente opinion, that the Synewes of wisedome, are slownesse of beleefe, and distrust: That more trust bee given to Countenances and Deedes, then to wordes: and in wordes, rather to suddaine passages, and surprised wordes: then to set and purposed wordes: Neither let that be feared which is sayde, fronti nulla fides, which is meant of a generall outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtile mocions and labours of the countenance and gesture, which as Q. Cicero elegantly sayth is Animi Janua, the gate of the Mynd: None more close then Tyberius, and yet Tacitus sayth of Gallus, Etenim vultu offersionem coniectaverat. So againe noting the differing Character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate: he sayeth, touching his fashion wherein hee carried his speeche of Germanicus, thus: Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire crederetur, but of Drusus thus, Paucioribus sed intentior, & fida oratione: and in another place speaking of his character of speech, when he did any thing that was gratious and populer, he sayeth, That in other thinges hee was velut eluctantium verborum: but then againe, Solutius loquebatur quando subueniret. So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation: nor noe such commaunded countenaunce (vultus jussus), that can sever from a fained tale, some of these fashions, either a more sleight and carelesse fashion, or more set & sormall, or more tedious and wandring or comming from, a man more drily and hardly.

Neither are Deedes such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideracion of their magnitude and nature; Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut majore emolumento fallat: and the Italian thinketh himselfe upon the point to be bought and sould: when he is better used then he was woont to be without manifest cause. For small favoures, they doe but lull men a sleepe, both as to Caution, and as to Industry, and are as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimenta socordiæ. So againe we see, how false the nature of some deeds are in that particular, which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollowe and unfaithfull reconcilement, which was made between them: whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius: Simul amicis eius præsecturas & tribunatus largitur: wherein under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependances.

As for words (though they be like waters to Phisitions, ful of flattery and uncertainty) yet they are not to be dispised, specially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so wee see Tyberius upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step foorth of his dissimulacion when he sayd, You are hurt, because you doc not raigne: of which Tacitus sayeth, Audita hæc, raram occulti pectoris voccm elicuere: correptamque Græco versu admonuit: ideo lædi quia non regnaret. And therefore the Poet doth elegantly cal passions, tortures, that urge men to confesse theyr secrets.

And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselves, and so setled; but that sometimes upon heate, sometimes upon braverye, sometime: upon kindenesse, sometimes upon trouble of minde and weaknesse, they open themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, Dimentira, y sacar as verdad: Tell a lye, and find a truth.

As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from Reportes: mens weakenesse and faultes are best knowne from theyr Enemies, theyr vertues, and abilityes from theyr friendes; theyr customes and Times from theyr servauntes: their conceites and opinions from theyr familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. Generall fame is light, & the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful: for to such men are more masked, Verior fama è domesticis emanat.

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is, by theyr natures and endes, wherein the weakest sorte of men are best interpreted by theyr Natures, and the wisest by theyr endes. For it was both pleasauntlye and wiselye sayde (though I thinke verye untruely) by a Nuntio of the pope, returning from a certayne Nation, where hee served as LIDGER: whose opinion beeing asked touching the appointemente of one to goe in his place, hee wished that in anye case they did not send one that was too wise: because no very wise man would ever imagine, what they in that country were like to doe: And certaynelye, it is an errour frequent, for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compasse reaches then are: the Italian proverb being elegant, & for the most part true.

There is commonly lesse mony. Jesse wisedome, and lesse good faith, then men doe accompt upon: But Princes upon a farre other Reason are best interpreted by their natures, and private persons by theyr ends, For Princes beeing at the toppe of humane desires, they have for the most part no particular endes, whereto they aspire: by distaunce from which a man mought take measure and scale of the rest of theyr actions and desires. which is one of the causes that maketh theyr heartes more inscructable: Neyther is it sufficient to infourme onr selves in mens endes and natures of the variety of them onely, but also of the predominancy what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so wee see, when Tigellinus sawe himselfe out-stripped by Petrovius Turpilianus in Neroés humours of pleasures Metus eius rimatur, he wrought upon Neroes fears, wherby he brake the others neck.

But to all this parte of Enquierie, the most compendious waye resteth in three thinges: The first to have generall acquaintaunce and in wardnesse with those which have generall atquaintance, and looke most into the worlde: and speciallye according to the diversitie of Businesse, and the diversitye of Persons, to have privacye and conversation with some one friend at least which is parfite and well intelligenced in every severall kinde. The seconde is to keepe a good mediocritye in libertie of speeche, and secrecy in most thinges libertye: secrecy where it importeth: for libertye of speeche inviteth and provoketh libertye to bee used againe: and so bringeth much to a mans knowledge: and secrecie on the other side induceth trust and inwardnesse. The last is the reducing of a mans selfe to this watchfull and serene habite, as to make accompte and purpose in everye conference and action, aswell to observe as to acte. For as Epictetus would have a Philosopher in eve ry particular action to say to himselfe, Et hoc volo, & etiam institutum servare: so a politique man in everye thing should say to himself; Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere. I have staied the longer upon thit precept of obtaining good information, because it is a maine part by it selfe, which aunswereth to all the rest. But above al things, Caution must be taken, that Men have a good staye and houlde of themselves, and that this much knowing doe not draw on much medling: For nothing is more unfortunate then light and rash intermeddling in many matters: So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but onely to this, to make a better & freer choise of those actions, which may concern us, & to conduct them with the lesse error and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is for men to take good informacion touching theyre own person and well to understand themselves: know, ing that as S. James sayth, though men looke oft in a glasse, yet they do sodainly forget themselves, wherin as the divine glasse is the word of God, so the politique glasse is the state of the world, or times wherin we live: In the which we are to behould our selves.

For men ought to take an unpartiall viewe of their owne abilities and vertues: and againe of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, & those other with the least, and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following.

First to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the generall state of the times: which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty, but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of theyr life to be more close retyred and reserved: as we see in Tyberius who was never seen at a play: and came not into the Senate in 12. of his last yeers: whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in mens eyes, which Tacitus observeth, Alia Tiberio morum via.

Secondly to consider how their Nature sorteth with professions and courses of life, & accordingly to make election if they be free, and if ingaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as we see was doone by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination being such neverthelesse, as a man cannot tel wel whether they were worse for a Prince or for a Priest.

Thirdly to consider how they sorte with those whom they are like to have Competitors and Concurrents and to take that course wherin there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as Cæsar Julius did, who at first was an Orator or Pleader but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and sawe there was no man of reputation for the warres but Pompeius upon whom the State was forced to relie; he forsooke his course begun toward a civile and popular greatnesse; and transgressed his designes to a marshall greatnesse.

Fourthly in the choyse of their friends, and dependaunces, to proceeed according to the Composition of their own nature, as we may see in Cæsar, all whose friends and followers were men active and effectuall, but not solemn or of reputation.

Fiftly to take speciall heed how they guide them selves by examples, in thinking they can doe as they see others doe: whereas perhappes their natures and carriages are farre differing; in which Error, it seemeth Pompey was, of whome Cicero sayeth, that hee was woont often to saye: Sylla potuit; Ego non potero? wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedinges of himselfe and his example, beeing the unlikest in the worlde, the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of Majesty and circumstance, and therefore the lesse effectuall. But this precept touching the politicke knowledge of our selves hath many other branches whereupon we cannot insist:

Next to the wellunderstanding and discerning of a mans selfe, there followeth the well opening and revealing a mans selfe, wherein we see nothing more usuall then for the more able man to make the lesse shewe. For there is a greate advantage in the well setting foorthe of a mans vertues, fortunes, merites, and againe in the artificiall covering of a mans weakenesses, defectes, disgraces, staying upon the one slyding from the other, cherishing the one by circumstaunces, gracing the other by exposition, and the like; wherein we see what Tacitus sayth of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his time, Omnium quæ dixerat fecer atque, arte quadam ostentator: which requireth indeed some arte, least it turne tedious and arrogant, but yet so; as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in Manners, then in Policye; for as it is sayd, Audacter calumniari, semper aliquid hæret, So except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity Audacter te vendita semper aliquid hæret. For it will sticke with the more ignoraunt and inferiour sort of men, though men of wisedome and ranke doe smile at it and despise it, and yet the authority wonne with many, doth countervaile the disdaine of a few. But if it be carried with decency and governement, as with a naturall pleasaunt and ingenious fashion, or at times when it is mixte with some perill and unsafety, (as in Military persons) or at tymes when others are most envied; or with easie and carelesse passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious: or with an equall freedome of taxing a mans selfe, aswell as gracing himselfe, or by occasion of repelling or putting downe others injurye or insolencie: It doth greately adde to reputation; and surelye not a fewe solide natures, that wante this ventositye, and cannot saile in the heighth of the windes, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by theyre moderacion.

But for these flourishes and inhansements of vertue, as they are not perchaunce unnecessary: So it is at leaste, necessary that vertue be not disualewed and imbased under the just price: which is doon in three manners; By offering and obtruding a mans selfe; wherein men thinke he is rewarded when he is accepted. By doing too much, which wil not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth saciety: and: By finding to soone the fruit of a mans vertue, in commendation, applause, honour, favoure, wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him heare what is truly said, Cave ne insuetus rebus maioribus videaris, si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat:

But the covering of defects is of no lesse importance, then the valewing of good parts. which may be doone likewise in three manners, by Caution, by Colour, and by Confidence, Caution is, when men doe ingeniously and discreetely avoyde to be put into those things for which they are not propper: wheras contrarywise bould and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaime all their wantes; Coloure is when men make a way for themselves, to have a construction made of their faultes or wantes: as proceedinge from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of the one, it is well sayde;

And therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see, that he pretend the vertue that shadoweth it, as if he be Dull, he must affect Gravitie, if a Cowarde, Mildenesse, and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not doe his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities: and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities, which are notorious in him to give colour that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations: for Confidence it is the last but the surest remedie: namely to depresse and seeme to despise whatsoever a man cannot attaine, observing the good principle of the Marchantes, who endevour to raise the price of their owne commodities, and to beate down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other: which is to face out a mans own defects: in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing: and to help that againe, to seeme on the other side that he hath least opinion of himselfe, in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in Poets, that if they shew their verses, and you except to any, they will say, That that lyne cost them more labour then any of the rest: and presently will seeme to disable, and suspect rather some other lyne, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above al in this righting and helping of a mans selfe in his owne carriage, he must take heed he shew not himselfe dismantelled and exposed to scorne and injury, by too much dulcenesse, goodnesse, and facility of nature, but shew some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified cariage with a readye rescussing of a mans selfe from scornes, is somtimes of necessity imposed upon men by somwhat in their person or fortune, but it ever succeedeth with good felicity.

Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour, to frame the mind to be pliaunt and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth mens fortunes so much as this: Idem manebat, nequeidem decebat: Men are where thty were, when occasions turne, and therefore to Cato, whom Livie maketh such an Architect of fortune, hee addeth that he had Versatile Ingenium: And thereof it commeth that these grave solemne wittes which must be like themselves, and cannot make departures have more dignity then fœlicity: But in some it is nature to bee somewhat viscouse and inwrapped, and not easie to turne: In some it is a conceipte, that is almost a nature, which is that men can hardlie make themselves beleeve that they oughte to chaunge their course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For Macciave noteth wisely how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, according to his ould biasse, when the nature of the warre was altered, and required hotte pursuite; In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgemente, that they do not discerne when thinges have a periode, but come in, too late after the occasion: As Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellowes, when they play in a fence-schoole, that if they have a blow then they remoove their weapon to that warde, and not before: In some other it is a loathnesse to leese labours passed, and a conceite that they can bring about occasions to their plie, and yet in the end, when they see no other remedye, then they come to it with disadvantage, as Tarquinius that gave for the third part of Sybillaes bookes the treeble price, when he mought at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever roote or cause this Restivenesse of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudiciall, and nothing is more politique then to make the wheels of our mind concentrique and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that uuelast spake of, but with difference is that which is well expressed, satis accede Deisque, that men do not only turne with the occasions but also runne with the occasions and not strain their credit or strength to over-harde or extreame points: but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foyle, not occupy them too much about one matter, winne opinion of moderation, please the moste, and make a showe of a perpetuall fœlicitye in all they undertake, which cannot but mightely increase reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it, and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high tearmes: Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat Imperator: sic & a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ, ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, & non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur. For if we observe, we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency, in managing of businesse: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plotte little: some can urge and pursue their owne plottes well, but cannot accommodate nor take in: either of uuhich is very unperfite without the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a mans selfe, for although depth of secrecy, and making way (qualis est via navis in Mari, which the French calleth Sourdes Menees, when men set thinges in worke without opening themselves at all) be somtimes both prosperous and admirable: yet many times Dissimulatio errores parit, qni dissimulatorem ipsam illaqueant. And therefore we see the greatest pollitiques have in a naturall and free manner professed their desires, rather then bin reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, That hee wished all men happy or unhappie as they stood his friendes or enemies: So Cæsar, when hee went first into Gaul, made no scruple to professe, that hee had rather bee first in a village, then second at Rome. So againe as soone as hee had begunne the warre, we see what Cicero sayth of him, Alter (meaning of Cæsar) non recusat, sed quodam modo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur Tyrannus. So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar in his very entrance into affaires, when he was a dearling of the Senate, yet in his haranges to the people, would sweare It a parentis honores consequi liceat, (which was no lesse then the Tyranny,) save that to helpe it, hee would stretch foorth his hand towardes a statua of Cæsars, that was erected in the place: and men laughed and woondered and sayde, Is it possible, or did you ever heare the like, and yet though hee meant no hurte, hee did it so handsomlye and ingenuouslye, and all these were prosperous, where as Pompeye who tended to the same ends, but in a more darke and dissembling manner, as Tacitus sayeth of him, Occultior non melior, wherein Salust concurreth ore probo, animo inverecundo made it his disseigne by infinite secret Engines, to cast the state into an absolute Anarchy and confusion, that the state mought cast it selfe into his Armes for necessity and protection, and so the soveraigne power bee putt upon him, and he never seene in it: and when hee had broughte it (as he thoughte) to that pointe when hee was chosen Consull alone; as never any, was; yet hee could make noe greate matter of it, because men understoode him not: but was faine in the end, to goe the beaten tracke of getting Armes into his handes, by coulour of the doubte of Cæsars dessignes: so tedidious, casuall, and unfortunate are these deepe dissimulations, whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this judgement, that they were a cunning of an inferiour fourme in regard of true pollicy, attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where speaking of Livia, he sayth: Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filij bene composita: for surely the continuall habite of dissimulation is but a weake and sluggish cunning, & not greatly politique.

Another precept of this Architecture of Fortune, is, to accustome our mindes to judge of the proportion or valewe of things, as they conduce, and are materiall to our particular ends, and that to doe substantially and nor superficially. For wee shall finde the Logicall parte (as I maye tearme it) of some mens mindes good, but the Mathematicall part erroneous, that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison, preferring things of shewe and sence before things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with accesse to Princes, others with popular same and applause, supposinge they are things of greate purchase, when in many Cases they are but matters of Envy, perill, and Impediment:

So some measure thinges accordinge to the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent aboute them; and thinke if they bee ever moouinge, that they must needs advance and proceede, as Cæsar saith in a dispisinge manner of Cato the second, when hee describeth howe laborious and indefatigable he was to noe greate purpose: Hæc omnia magno studio agebat. So in moste thinges men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should bee the Fittest.

As for the true marshalling of mens pursutes towards theire fortune as they are more or lesse materiall, I houlde them to stand thus; Firste the amendment of their own Minds. For the Remoove of the Impediments of the mind wil sooner cleare the passages of fortune, then the obteininge fortune wil remooe the Impediméts of the mind; In second place I set downe wealth and meanes, which I know most men woulde have placed firste: because of the generall use which it beareth towardes all varietie of occasions. But that opinion I may condemne with like reason as Macchiavell doth that other: that monies were the e sinews of the warres, wheras (saith he) the true sinews of the warres are the sinews of mens Armes, that is a valiant, populous and Military Nation: & he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon who when Cræsus shewed him his treasury of goulde saide to him, that if another came that had better Iron, he woulde be maister of his Gould In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not monies that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steele of mens Mynds, Witte, Courage, Audacity, Resolution, Temper, Industry, and the like: In thirde place I set down Reputation, because of the peremptory Tides & Currants it hath, which if they bee not taken in their due time, are sildome recovered, it beinge extreame harde to plaie an after game of reputation. And lastly, I place honoure, which is more easily wonne by any of the other three, much more by all, then any of them can bee purchased by honour. To conclude this precepte, as there is order and priority in Matter, so is there in Time, the proposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest Errors: while men fly to their ends when they shoulde intend their beginninings: and doe not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshall them according to greatnes and not according to instance, not observing the good precepte Quod nunc instat agamus.

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to imbrace any matters, which doe occupie to great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a mans eares.

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of Burden, as Lawyers, Orators painefull divines, and the like, are not commonlie so politique for their owne fortune, otherwise then in their ordinary way, because they want time to learne particulars, to waite occasions, and to devise plottes.

Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine, which surely a man may do, if he do well interlace his businesse, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he prin cipally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action, so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third, and if he can have no parte of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somwhat els, and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somwhat in time to come, and if he can contrive no effect or substaunce from it, yet to win som good opinion by it, or the like so that he should exact an account of himself of every action, to reape somwhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he faile of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impollitique then to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that dooth so, leeseth infinite occasions which enterueine, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat, that he shall need afterwards: then for that which he urgeth for the present; and therfore men must be parfite in that rule: Hæc oportet facere, & illa non omittere.

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to ingage a mans selfe peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident, but ever to have a window to flie out at, or away to retyre; following the wisedom in the ancient fable, of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was drie, whether they should go and the one mooved to go down into a pit because it was not likely the water would dry there, but the other answered, True, but if it do, how shall we get out againe?

Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousnesse, but only to caution and moderation Et ama tanquam inimicus suturus, & odi tanquam amaturus: For it utterly betraieth al utility, for men to imbarque them selves to far, into unfortunate friendships: troublesom spleans; & childish & humorous envies or æmulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an example, led, because I wold not have such knowledges which I note as deficient to be thought things Imaginative, or in the ayre; or an observation or two, much made of but thinges of bulke and masse: whereof an end is hardlier made, then a beginning. It must be likewise conceived that in these pointes which I mencion and set downe, they are far from complete tractates of them: but onelye as small peeces for patternes: And lastlye, no man I suppose will thinke, that I meane fortunes are not obteyned without all this adoe; For I know they come tumblinge into some mens lappes, and a nomber obtaine good fortunes by dilligence, in a plaine way: Little intermedlinge: and keeping themselves from grosse errors.

But as Cicero when he setteth down an Idea of a parfit Orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a Prince or a Courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made accordinge to the perfection of the Arte, and not according to common practise: So I understand it that it ought to be done in the description of a Pollitique man: I meane pollitique for his owne fortune.

But it must be remembred al this while, that the precepts which we have set down, are of thatkind which may be counted & called Bonæ Artes, as for evill arts, if a man would set down for himselfe that principle of Machiavel: That a man seeke not to attaine vertue it selfe: But the apparance onely thereof, because the credite of vertue is a helpe, but the use of it is cumber: or that other of his principles: That he presuppose, that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by feare, and therefore that he seeke to have every man obnoxius, lowe, & in streight which the Italians cal seminar spine, to sowe thornes: or that other principle conteined in the verse which Cice ro cyteth cadant amici, dummodo Inimici intercidant, as the Trium virs which sould every one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of theire enemiees: or that other protestation of L. Catilina to set on fire & trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, & to unwrappe their fortunes. Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam, or that other principle of Lysander That children are to be deceived with comfittes, & men with othes, & the like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in al things) there are more in number then of the good: Certainly with these dispensations from the lawes of charity & integryty the pressing of a mans fortune, may be more ha sty and compendious. But it is in life, as it is in ways The shortest way is comonly the fowlest & surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men if they be in their own power & doe beare & sustaine themselves, and bee not caryed awaye with a whirle winde or tempest of ambition: oughte in the pursute of their owne fortune, to set before their eies, not only that general Map of the world. That al things are vanity & vexation of spirit, but many other more par ticular Cards & directions, cheefly that, That Being, without wel being: is a curse; & the greater being, the greater curse, And that all vertue is most rewarded, & al wickednesse most punished in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently.

And so of the contrary. And secondly they oughte to looke up to the eternal providence and divine judgemente, which often subverteth the wisdome of evyll plots & imaginations, according to that scripture He hath conceived mischiefe & shal bring foorth a vainething And although men should refraine themselves from injury and evil artes, yet this incessant & Sabbathlesse pursute of a mans fortune, leaveth not tribute which we owe to God of our time who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our substance, & a seaventh, which is more strict of our time: and it is to smal purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, & a perpetual groveling spirit upon earth eating dust as doth the serpent, Atque affigit humo Divinæ particulam auræ: And if any man flatter himself that he will imploy his fortune wel, though he shold obtain it ill, as was said concerning Aug. Cæsar, & after of Septimius Severus, That either they shold never have bin born or else they shold never have died, they did so much mischief in the pursut & ascentof their greatnes, & so much good when they were established yet these compensations & satisfactions, are good to be used, but never good to be purposed: And lastly it is not amisse for men in their race toward their fortuneto cooll themselves a litle with that conceit which is elegantly expressed bythe Emperor, Charls the 5. in his instruc tions to the K. his son, That fortune hath sowhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much woed, she is the farder of. But this last is but a remedy for those whose Tasts are corrupted: let men rather build upo that foundation which is as a cornerstone of divinity and philosophie, wherein they joyne close, namely that same Primum quærite. For divinity sayth Primum quærite regnum Dei & ista omnia adiicientur Vobis: & Philosophy saith, Primum quærite bona animi, caetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. And although the humane foundation hath somewhat of the same, as we see in M: Brutus when hee brake forth into that speech.

Yet the divine foundation is upon the Rocke. But this may serve for a Tast of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge, secret and retyred in both these respects, in which things are deemed secret: for some things are secret, because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter: wee see all governments are obscure and invisible.

Such is the description of governments; we see the government of God over the world is hidden; insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularitie and confusion; The government of the Soule in mooving the Body is inward and profound, and the passages therof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Againe, the wisedome of Antiquitie (the shadowes whereof are in the Poets) in the description of torments and paines, next unto the crime of Rebellion, which was the Giants offence, doth detest the offence offacilitie: as in Sysiphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars; Neverthelesse even unto the generall rules and discourses of pollicie, and government, there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things ought as far as the frailtie of Man permitteth, to be manifest, & revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that this Globe which seemeth to us a dark and shady body is in the view of God, as Christall, Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile christallo. So unto Princes and States, and specially towardes wise Senats and Councels, the natures and dispositions of the people, their conditions, and necessities, their factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents ought to be in regard of the varietie of their Intelligences, the wisedome of their observations, and the height of their station, where they keepe Centinell, in great part cleare and transparent; wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a maister of this Science, and is so wel assisted, I thinke it decent to passe over this part in silence, as willing to obtaine the certificate, which one of the ancient Philosophers aspired unto, who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it mought be certified for his part, that there was one that knewe how to hold his peace.

Notwithstanding for the more publique part of Government, which is Lawes, I think good to note onley one deficience, which is, that all those which have written of Lawes, have written either as Philosophers, or as lawiers, & none as Statesmen. As for the Philosophers, they make imaginary Lawes for imaginary common-wealths, & their discourses are as the Stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the Lawyers, they write according to the States where they live, what is received Law, & not what ought to be Law; For the wisedome of a Lawmaker is one, & of a Lawyer is another. For ther are in Nature certaine fountaines of Justice, whence all Civil Lawes are derived, but as streames; & like as waters doe take tinctures and tastes from the soyles through which they run; So doe civill Lawes vary according to the Regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountaines; Againe the wisedome of a Lawmaker consisteth not onely in a platforme of Justice; but in the application thereof, taking into consideration, by what meanes Lawes may be made certaine, and what are the causes & remedies of the doubtfulnesse and incertaintie of Law, by what meanes Lawes may be made apt and easie to be executed, and what are the impediments, and remedies in the execution of lawes, what influence lawes touching private right of Meum & Tuum, have into the publike state, and how they may be made apt and agreable, how lawes are to be penned and delivered, whether in Texts or in Acts, briefe or large, with preambles, or without howe they are to bee pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best meanes to keepe them from being too vast in volumes, or too ful of multiplicitie & crosnesse, how they are to be expounded, When upon causes emergent, and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching generall points or questions, how they are to be pressed, rigorously, or tenderly, how they are to be Mitigated by equitie and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict Lawe are to be mingled in the same Courts, or kept a part in severall Courts; Againe, how the practise, profession, and erudition of Lawe is to be censured and governed, and many other points touching the administration, and (as I may tearme it) animation of Lawes. Upon which I insist the lesse, because I purpose (if22De pruden tia legislatoria, five, de fontibus Juris. God give me leave) having begunne a worke of this Nature, in Aphorismes, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meane time for deficient.

And for your Majesties Lawes of England, I could say much of their dignitie, and somewhat of their defect: But they cannot but excell the civill Lawes in fitnesse for the government: for the civill Law was, non hos quæsitum munus in usus: It was not made for the countries which it governeth: hereof I cease to speake, because I will not intermingle matter of Action, with matter of generall Learning.